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One neglected yet very important feature of family business is its internal 
homogeneity. Different from heterogeneity which focuses on differences across family
firms, homogeneity here refers to the continuity and similarity of decision-making
patterns either over time or across business units in a single family firm. This dissertation
attempts to explore homogeneity in family businesses as well as its antecedents and 
performance consequences. To distinguish different types of homogeneity, strategic
persistence is defined as homogeneity of strategic patterns over time and the pursuit of a
dominant strategy as the homogeneity across related business units. Based upon S&P
1500 manufacturing firms from 1996 to 2013, it is found that family firms have a higher 
level of strategic persistence and a more consistent dominant strategy than non-family
firms. In addition, it appears that being older, with less organizational slack and having
higher family involvement in ownership and management tends to strengthen the two 
kinds of homogeneity in family businesses. Finally, it is found that high homogeneity in 






family firms, especially for those with high family involvement in management. 
Theoretical implications and limitations are discussed. 
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Recent studies in the family business literature start to highlight that high 
heterogeneity may be a distinguishing feature in the family business population (Chua et 
al., 2012). Nevertheless, one neglected yet very important feature of family business is 
the internal homogeneity of family businesses. Indeed, different from heterogeneity
which focuses on differences across family firms, homogeneity refers to the continuity
and similarity of decision-making patterns either over time or across business units in a 
single family firm. This dissertation attempts to explore homogeneity in family
businesses as well as its antecedents and performance consequences. To distinguish
different types of homogeneity, strategic persistence is defined as homogeneity of 
strategic patterns over time and the pursuit of a dominant strategy as the homogeneity
across related business units. Thus, strategic persistence refers to the continuation of 
patterns of resource allocations in key strategic dimensions over time, while dominant 
strategy refers to a corporation-level strategy that involves similar patterns of resource
allocations in key strategic dimensions among related business units in a diversified 
multi-business company. Note that both constructs intend to highlight the constancy of
strategic decisions in individual family businesses. In addition, both constructs intend to 








   
 
   
 













only capture a single strategic decision such as R&D investment (Chrisman & Patel, 
2012) or internationalization (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). 
Studying strategic persistence and dominant strategy may help to advance our 
understandings of family firms in two ways. To begin, both strategic persistence and 
dominant strategy refer to an idiosyncratic yet homogenous way of decision-making in 
family business. Thus, family firms are different from non-family firms not only because
what they do but also because how they do (being more consistent over time and across 
business units). In addition, exploring the performance consequences of strategic 
persistence and dominant strategy may provide an additional rationale why some family
firms may perform differently from non-family firms. 
This dissertation follows a behavior theory framework. Behavioral theory of the
firm (e.g. Cyert & March, 1963) suggests that the combination of goals, governance, and 
resources is critical to any strategic action including strategic persistence and dominant 
strategy. This framework is chosen because it covers major determining factors in 
strategic formulation and its performance consequences (Hofer & Schendel, 1978), also 
because family firms tend to have unique goal-settings, resource compositions and 
governance structures compared to non-family firms (Carney, 2005). Indeed, such a
theoretical framework has been embraced by family business researchers in 
distinguishing family firms from non-family firms as well as the differences among 
family firms (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Chua et al., 2012)
As will be further elaborated, it is argued that the presence of family goals 
(maintaining family traditions and being parsimonious) and family governance over the























over time and across diversified business units. Associated with this framework, it is
hypothesized that firms that are older, with less organizational slack and higher family
ownership will have a higher extent of strategic persistence and dominant strategy in 
family business. Finally, it is argued that the unique nature of resources as well as the 
coordination of resource utilization across diversified units in family business should 
make such a homogenous pattern of decision-making result in better performance relative 
to that in non-family business.
The sample is composed of S&P manufacturing firms from 1996 to 2013. 
Hoover’s, ExecuComp, Fundinguniverse.com, ancestry.com, firm websites, and firm 
proxy statements are used to identify founding families and the family members. All data 
associated with corporate governance and family business come from firm proxy
statements. Other data comes from the Compustat database. Endogeneity is controlled by
using four instrumental variables that are statistically correlated to family business 
variables but not to the dependent variables and by using for one year lags between
dependent variables and other variables. Due to the longitudinal nature of data, this 
dissertation uses fixed-effect longitudinal regression models to test all hypotheses. 
Regression results from the primary and robustness analyses largely support the
idea that family firms have higher strategic persistence and a more homogeneous 
dominate strategy than non-family firms, and such a higher level of homogeneity would 
result in better performance in family business. 
The dissertation is composed of two essays. The first essay hypothesizes and tests 
the antecedents and performance consequences of strategic persistence in family








consequences of dominant strategy in family business. Note that although both essays use
the same theoretical framework, each has distinctive arguments due to the specific causal 
relationships in question. This dissertation ends with a conclusion chapter summarizing

















    
 
                                                 
    
    
  
 
ESSAY 1: FAMILY BUSINESS, STRATEGIC PERSISTENCE 
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Introduction
Many corporations are controlled by a large shareholder group, typically founding
family (Villalonga & Amit, 2006, 2009). Indeed, family businesses1 are the dominant 
organizational form around the world (Morck & Steier, 2005), and research suggests that 
family firms behave differently from non-family firms (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Heterogeneity also exists among family firms (Chrisman &
Patel, 2012; Chua et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2013), so “a theory of the family firm 
must not only be able to distinguish between family and non-family firms but must also 
be able to explain variations among family firms” (Chua et al., 2012, p1104). Despite the 
inherent differences of firm behaviors between family and non-family firms and among
family firms themselves, family involvement in ownership and firm governance is under-
researched (Chrisman et al., 2012).
One criticism of family firms is that they are quite resistant to change in terms of 
firm behaviors (Chandler, 1990). Though some may choose to embrace rather than 
1. Family firms are defined by a family’s involvement in ownership and governance and a
vision for how the firm will benefit the family, potentially across generations (Chrisman &











   
 
 






   
  
    
repulse change (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), the general 
impression is that family firms tend to avoid uncertainty and risk-taking by persisting in
existing strategies, routines and practices (Block, 2012; König et al., 2013). Nevertheless, 
there remain numerous gaps in the literature. Firstly, scholars often focus on singular
dimensions of change, which cannot necessarily extrapolate to a broader understanding of 
strategic change (e.g. Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). In addition, 
research often draws attention to between-firm differences, while the question of the 
persistence of strategic actions in the temporal dimension is overlooked, despite its 
relevance to well-documented long-term orientation in family business (Lumpkin &
Brigham, 2011; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Miller et al., 2007). Lastly, no one has 
explored the performance consequences of the persistence of strategic decisions. 
The central question this study intends to explore then is the relationship between 
family businesses and strategic persistence. The antecedents and the performance
consequences of strategic persistence in family businesses are also explored. In this 
regard, strategic persistence is defined as the continuation of similar patterns in resource
allocations in multiple key strategic dimensions over time (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990; .Hambrick et al., 1993). 
Such a concept is different from risk-taking, innovation or other decision-making
in a number of ways. First, previous studies often focus on one strategic dimension (e.g. 
R&D investment, diversification, etc.), while strategic persistence refers to strategic 
choices in multiple strategic areas. Second, in contrast to most studies in the family
business literature, strategic persistence draws its focus over a relatively long time 












   







new stream of research on the temporal dynamics of decision-making in family business.
Note that high persistence does not always mean that the firm is risk-averse, as a firm can 
be risk-taking (e.g. high in R&D investment) and persistent (e.g. maintain high R&D 
investment over time) at the same time. Third, a family firm’s persistence in strategic 
decisions provides one additional explanation regarding how family involvement affects 
firm performance. Put differently, some family firms perform differently than non-family
firms and other family firms (Miller et al., 2007) not only because they make
idiosyncratic strategic decisions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), but also because they realize
these decisions in a different (e.g. more/less persistent) manner. 
This essay begins with an overview of strategic persistence and relevant concepts 
in the literature, and then develops hypotheses related to family business and strategic 
persistence. This essay also explore firm age, organizational slack and family ownership 
as three antecedents related to strategic persistence in family businesses. After that, this 
essay explores the relationship between strategic persistence and firm performance in 
family business. Then, the methodology, analytic results and implications are discussed. 
Strategic Persistence
In this study, strategic persistence is defined as the continuation of patterns of 
resource allocations in key strategic dimensions over time (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990; Hambrick et al., 1993). Indeed, scholars have long been interested in the pattern of
firm’s strategies over time and their impact on firm performance. Firms tend to stick to 
their own strategies, and firm strategy does not necessarily enhance a firm’s survival and 
performance unless aligned with the firm’s history (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996; Harrison 





















    
    
tendency as well as the incentive to be persistent in its own strategy (Kisfalvi, 2000). 
Hence, strategic persistence2 is a concept that is in direct opposition to strategic change in 
the long-term (Ford et al., 2008).
There are a number of noteworthy implications related to this definition. First, it is 
descriptive, not predictive in nature. Such a way of defining strategic persistence can 
avoid the problem of tautology in conceptualization (Priem & Butler, 2001). Second, in 
alignment with the resource-based theory in the strategic management literature (Barney, 
1991; Sirmon et al., 2007, 2011), this definition emphasizes resource allocation as the key
issue in strategic decision-making (Mintzberg, 1978). Third, this definition 
conceptualizes strategic decision-making as a multi-dimensional construct related to 
resource allocations in multiple strategic areas (Carpenter, 2000; Zhang, 2006). Fourth, 
this definition assumes that at least some companies are willing and able to maintain a
relatively stable pattern of strategic decision(s) over time. Hence, it directly contradicts 
the assumptions that organizations are homogenous and they are just passive reflections 
of industrial dynamics (Conner, 1991). Fifth, this definition highlights the pattern of 
persistence of strategic decisions rather than the strategic decisions themselves. The latter
are concerned with a static state of resource allocation whereas the former emphasizes the 
temporal dynamics of resource distributions (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Sixth, 
whereas there are a number of studies concerning the variations (Smith & Grimm, 1987), 
dynamics (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Zajac et al., 2000) and deviations (Carpenter, 2000)
2. Another concept that relates to strategic persistence is organizational inertia, as "structures
of organizations have high inertia when the speed of reorganization is much lower than the
rate at which environmental conditions change" (Hannan & Freeman, 1984, p151). 
Nevertheless, organizational inertia is more about the inability to change, while persistence is





   





   
   







    
of strategic decision-makings from the previous temporal term to the current temporal 
term, none of them has explored the question in a long time window. Put differently, 
while the existing literature largely looks at short-term change, this study tends to explore
the dynamics (whether being persistent) of strategic decision-making in the long run 
(Amburgey, Kelly & Barnettm 1994).
In order to explore the causal effect of family’s involvement on strategic
persistence, as well as the performance consequences of strategic persistence, the next 
section follows a behavioral theory framework. It assumes that a decision-maker’s goals 
and organizational governance eventually determines strategic action in business. On the
other hand, it is organizational resource that affects the implementation of strategic action 
and eventually firm performance (Barney, 1991; Cyert & March, 1963). 
Behavioral Theory Framework
Behavioral theory explores the “black box” in economic organizations in terms of
formulation and implementation of strategic actions (Hofer & Schendel, 1978). 
According to the theory, organizational decision-makers pursue idiosyncratic goals,
which eventually determine organizational behaviors (Cyert & March, 1963, p26–43). In 
this regard, behavioral theory explicitly recognizes the heterogeneity of goals in different 
organizations. For instance, some organizations may place higher priority on firm growth 
while some others may emphasize efficiency and performance (Greve, 2008). This view 
has been largely embraced by family business scholars (Chua et al., 2012), as family
decision-makers often possess heterogeneous goals (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013), leading
to diverging strategic actions (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). On the other hand, the 



















   
  
  
not entirely alleviated by contracts (Cyert & March, 1963). This assumption implies that 
organizational governance determines which goals turn into strategic actions
(Williamson, 1999). If a decision-maker is perceived to have power and legitimacy such 
as the case of family owner-manager, his/her goals are more likely to manifest into firm 
actions (Mitchell et al., 1997; Useem, 1993).
In the end, the implementation of strategic action relies on resources in the
organization (Hofer & Schendel, 1978). Indeed, the effective implementation of 
organizational learning, adaption, and innovation is dependent upon the availability of 
resources (Greve, 2003; Levinthal & March, 1993; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). On the other
hand, organizations often have difficulties in acquiring new resources as well as 
leveraging and shedding existing resources, meaning that the successful implementation
of any kind of strategic action depends on resources in organization (Sirmon et al., 2007, 
2011). Again, family firms may have a unique set of family-endowed resources such as 
human, social, patient, survivability, and governance capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), 
which may give competitive advantages to some family firms over non-family
competitors (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Habbershon et al., 2003).  
Overall, the behavioral theory framework suggests that the combination of goals, 
governance, and resources is critical to any strategic action including strategic 
persistence. This essay chooses to use this framework not only because it covers major 
determining factors in strategic formulation and its performance consequences (Hofer &
Schendel, 1978), but also because it has been embraced by family business researchers in 
distinguishing family firms from non-family firms as well as other family firms 
















    
   
  
  
                                                 
    
      
  
nature of resources in family business should make strategic persistence more favorable 
compared to the case in non-family business. The following section intends to build 
hypotheses relating family business to strategic persistence. 
Hypothesis Development: Family Business and Strategic Persistence
In alignment with the behavioral theory framework, all antecedents3 behind high 
strategic persistence in family firm can be grouped into goal and governance. These two 
categories refer to the fact that family decision-makers choose to persist more than non-
family ones because they are motivated to do so (goals), and because they have the 
discretion to do so (governance). This classification also aligns with the family business 
literature in terms of possible mechanisms by which family involvement may affect 
strategic actions (Chrisman et al., 2013). 
Goal
One basic assumption in the management literature is that firm decision-makers
have various economic goals, which eventually result in various strategic decisions across 
firms (Cyert & March, 1963). Regarding strategic persistence, organizational decision-
makers may perceive that maintaining persistent strategy is more aligned with their
economic interest, as strategic change may either reduce existing benefits or bring in 
additional costs (Miller, 1991; Vollman, 1996). The former implies that change in 
existing strategy is often associated with high utility loss for owner-managers, whereas 
the latter suggests that initiating change may increase costs due to the additional resource
3. In this essay, resources are conceptualized as organizational contingencies that may affect 
















    






   
investments. Indeed, the literature acknowledges that there are rewards for exploiting
strategies established in the past (Levinthal & March, 1993). Returns on new and perhaps 
superior strategies may be less certain compared to returns on existing strategies, because
performance of a new strategy is less reliable and less explicable to organizational 
stakeholders (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). 
In the family business literature, a number of studies recognize that family firms 
behave differently from non-family firms and one another due to the presence of 
idiosyncratic goals in owning families (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 2010; 2013). In 
addition, family business scholars suggest that family owner-managers may have unique 
non-economic goals including the willingness to exercise authority and influence, the 
emotional value of owning a firm, family members’ identification with the firm, and 
renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession (Berrone et al., 2012). 
Accordingly, family firms tend to favor strategies that can help achieve these goals 
(Chrisman et al., 2012), and be averse to strategies that may potentially hinder their 
achievements (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Chrisman & Patel, 2012).
While there may be a number of family goals that can relate to strategic
persistence in family business, this essay focuses on the goals of maintaining family
tradition and being parsimonious. Family tradition is chosen because it lies at the center 
of the family’s socio-emotional or non-economic concerns (Berrone et al., 2005), and 
also because it is directly related to the continuity of family’s control over generations 
(Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). Parsimony is chosen because it is a unique feature related to 
family’s management of resources, which is expected to determine the formulation of





    
   










    
 
   
  
 




firms choose to be persistent in decision-making because they want to stick to their 
traditions, and because they are parsimonious in resource acquisition and utilization. 
One non-economic goal in family business is to sustain the family’s tradition and 
heritage in the business (Berrone et al., 2012; Carney & Gedajlovic, 2003). Indeed, 
family tradition4 consists of preservation, constancy, and durability (Lumpkin &
Brigham, 2011). For family owners the firm is not just an asset that can be sold 
(Chrisman, Chua, Steier, Wright & Mckee, 2012; Zellweger et al., 2012), but rather a
symbol of family’s heritage and tradition that should be succeeded into later generation 
(Casson, 1999; Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). Hence, choosing to continue past strategies may
be perceived as a practice that sustains family heritage and tradition (Kieser, 1989). Note
that the family tradition may be innovative and entrepreneurial. In this regard, the family
business may persist in their past startegies, reflected in high R&D investment over time. 
In contrast, practices that deviate from past strategy may be perceived as a
violation of family tradition and history, and be discarded by family owner-managers. 
Although under some circumstances family firms may choose to violate their long-lasting
traditions, especially when their socio-emotional wealth is under threat (Gomez-Mejia et 
al., 2007; Chrisman & Patel, 2012), the general impression is that family owners are risk-
averse and willing to stick to what they have done in the past (Lumpkin & Brigham, 
2011). 
Family tradition also manifests in the temporal consideration of a family firm’s 
strategic decision-making. In particular, the presence of family tradition make family
4. A relevant but slightly different concept is family legacy. However, legacy concerns what
can be passed for future family generations, while tradition concerns the preservation of what







   












decision-makers prioritize the long-range decisions and actions that may last for an 
extended time period (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; Lumpkin et al., 2010; Lumpkin 
& Brigham, 2011). This would suggest that the frequency of changing strategic decisions 
in family business is not as high as that in non-family business. In other words, family
businesses are more likely to adhere to long-term plans than non-family businesses. 
Hence, strategic persistence in family business is a reflection of decisions previously
developed and applied consistently over time.
Furthermore, one important part of family tradition in business is to pass the
control to later-generation family members (Berrone et al., 2012). Indeed, it has been 
found that for the owning family, intra-family and especially inter-generation succession 
intention is more important than the family’s dominant position in ownership or the 
duration of family control in affecting firm decision-making (Zellweger et al., 2012). On 
the other hand, the owning family often uses unique criteria in choosing a family
successor, such as the convergence to family tradition, obedience to the old generation, as 
well as the maintenance of intra-family relationships (De Massis et al., 2008; Gersick et 
al., 1997; Lee et al., 2003). This would suggest that among all later-generation family
members, those with the intent to follow previous strategies are more likely to be chosen 
as successors of family business. In addition, family members in younger generations 
often live under the shadow of the older family generation, even if they have already
taken the control of the business (Davis & Harveston, 1999). Thus, late-generation family
members are likely to follow whatever the older generation has formulated in firm 




















the intention to maintain family control across generations should lead to strategic
persistence.
Beside family tradition, another goal behind strategic persistence in family
business is parsimony. As Carney (2005) points out, family decision-makers tend to be 
parsimonious in resource utilization and acquisition. Parsimony helps improve the 
efficiency of resource utilization, often by reducing unnecessary expenditures (Carney, 
2005). Indeed, empirical evidence has shown that family business tends to provide lower 
compensation to family executives (Combs et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003) and 
lower dividends or profit sharing (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005) to reduce the overall
expenses. This would suggest that family decision-makers are motivated to improve
efficiency by reducing administrative costs and avoiding unnecessary expenditures. In 
this regard, family owners-managers may favor maximizing rent appropriation of current 
strategy rather than searching for new alternatives (Pérez-González, 2006). Hence, family
decision-makers may favor maintaining current strategy (i.e. being persistent in strategic 
decisions) rather than experimenting with new alternatives. 
In addition, parsimony in resource acquisition also relates to the owning family’s 
reluctance to acquire resources from non-family parties because doing so may dilute the
family’s control in business. In this instance, family business often avoids depending on 
debt or outside equity in order to raise fresh funds (Chua et al., 2011; Zellweger et al., 
2012). In addition, family owners often intentionally reserve managerial or other key
business positions for family members because doing so may induce less owner-manager 
















                                                 
  
     




   
   
     
   
     
  
creation and preservation of family-centered socio-emotional wealth5 (Berrone et al., 
2012; Chrisman et al., 2014). Nevertheless, changing a firm’s strategy inevitably involves 
new financial and human capital investments. To overcome the limitations of family-
endowed resources, family decision-makers have to employ non-family managers and 
other talent and/or search for external investment (Carney, 2005; Chrisman, Memili &
Misra, 2014; Chua et al., 2011). This is not favored by family-owner-managers unless the
family is under significant threat of losing its socio-emotional wealth endowment in the
firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Chrisman & Patel, 2012) or with no other choice (Ilias, 
2006).  
Governance
Decision-makers must hold dominant positions in corporate governance to 
transmit their goals into strategic actions in organizations (Bunderson, 2003; Cybert &
March, 1963; Tang et al., 2011). In this sense, group attributes of the dominant coalition6 
such as demographic characteristics (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), diversity (Goodstein et 
al., 1994), position (Daily & Dalton, 1997) and power relationships (Ocasio, 1994; Shen 
& Cannella, 2002) often affect decision-making processes. In addition, decision-makers 
5. Socio-emotional wealth refers to non-financial aspects or “affective endowments” of
members in the controlling families, in terms of the propensity to exercise authority and 
influence, the emotional value of owning a firm, family members’ identification with the
firm, and renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession (Berrone et al., 
2012). 
6. Dominant coalition is conceptualized as the governance network of decision-makers - such 
as owners, top manager(s) or top management team (TMT) - within an organization that
influence the goals and the resources of the organization (Cyert & March, 1963). In a family
business, the dominant coalition refers to that group of family members who control, manage
and make major decisions aimed at shaping and preserving the business across generations




















are often responsible for guiding the rationalization of strategic decisions (Gioia &
Chittipeddi, 1991), such as interpreting and disseminating information throughout the
whole company (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Hence, governance not only ensures the 
transitions of a decision-maker’s goals into the formulation of strategic decisions, but also 
facilitates the spread of such a decision throughout the whole organization (Hofer &
Schendel, 1978). On the other hand, the family business literature acknowledges that 
family firms may possess a governance structure different from non-family firms 
(Carney, 2005). Indeed, when ownership and management are tightly held by a limited 
number of individuals such as the case in family business, it is likely that individualized 
and simplified rules and heuristics are used in planning strategic decisions (Gedajlovic, 
Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004). By contrast, professional managers are constrained by
formal procedures and the need to quantify risks and returns to justify decision-making
(Stewart & Hitt, 2012). 
Regarding strategic persistence, the likelihood of persistence is dependent upon 
the governance structure by which decision-maker’s willingness may transfer into 
strategic action in organizations (Gibbs, 1993; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Zahra, 1996).
Thus, the extent to which family-centered goals can be transmitted into firm decision-
making is dependent upon the power, legitimacy, and family-centered-stakeholder-
salience of the dominant coalition (Carney, 2005). Hence, governance is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for strategic persistence to take place. Put differently, having
personalized, particularized, and family-stakeholder-salient governance does not
automatically ensure the rise of strategic persistence. The persistence arises only when 















   
   
 
In this regard, family business governance features the combination of
personalism and particularism (Carney, 2005). Personalism refers to the “personalization 
of authority that allows the family to project its own vision onto the business”, while
particularism means that “family control rights permit the family to intervene in the
affairs of the firm to substitute other, “particularistic” criteria of their choosing” (Carney, 
2005, p253). The combination of personalism and particularism ensures that family-
centered goals can transmit into firm strategies such as making persistent strategic 
decisions over time. 
From a different view, stakeholder theory suggests that the family owner-
manager’s goal is not only transmitted through their power and legitimacy but also their 
identity of belonging to the control family. In this regard, Mitchell et al. (2011) argue that 
a distinguishing characteristic of family firms is a tendency to confer power and/or 
legitimacy to certain family members because of who they are, even though their actual 
power and legitimacy would not normally warrant such attention. Managers in a family
firm may consider the importance and urgency of claims from family stakeholders 
(Mitchell et al., 1997). This view complements Carney’s arguments, as it suggests that 
family’s influence over governance is not necessarily limited in their power and 
discretion, and family members who are not involved in operation may also post their
influences on business.
All taken, due to the unique combination of goals and governances in family firms 
compared to non-family firms, family firms are more likely to adhere to persistent 








   













   
  
 
   
Hypothesis 1: Family businesses have a higher level of strategic persistence than 
non-family businesses. 
Hypothesis Development: Age, Organizational Slack and Family Ownership in
Family Business
Family businesses comprise a heterogeneous population that varies significantly
by idiosyncratic goals and governances that are aligned with each owning family (Chua et 
al., 2012). While Hypothesis 1 focuses on the general tendency of family firms, it should 
not be interpreted to mean that all family firms are alike. Some family firms may instead 
have a higher level of strategic persistence compared to others. Following the goal-
governance framework developed above, it is argued that firm age, organizational slack, 
and family ownership of the firm may affect the salience of goals and governance in 
family business. Thus, these three factors make some family firms more persistent than 
others. 
Firm Age
Scholars have long claimed that organizations have the tendency to become rigid 
and inflexible when they grow older (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). As firms age, their 
behaviors become increasingly guided by existing norms and traditions (Deephouse, 
1996). On the other hand, the development of tradition often derives from prior operating
experiences (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Thus, ceteris paribus, in comparison to younger 
firms, older firms have more salient traditions embedded (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).
It is expected that firm age should positively relate to strategic persistence in 
family business for two reasons. First, when family firms age, family tradition becomes 























concerns the preservation of past long-standing aspirations in the family system (Miller & 
Le Breton-Miller, 2005), thus the value and importance of family tradition should 
become larger when a family firm ages. This is especially true given the higher 
interaction and overlap between family and business (Habbershon et al., 2003), the 
owning family’s dominant position in firm governance (Carney, 2005) and the owning
family’s endowment of key strategic resources (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). In this regard, 
compared to younger family firms, older family firms are more likely to make persistent
strategic decisions because family tradition becomes more valuable and important to 
family decision-makers (Lumpkin et al., 2010; Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). 
Second, the question of firm age is more complex in family firms, because the
family system also evolves with age. In this sense, when a family firm ages, additional 
individuals may join in the family system by genetic, marital and kinship ties (Gersick et 
al., 1997). The inclusion of new family members would make the family tradition more
salient, as these members are born, educated and groomed with family tradition. Thus,
older family firms are more likely to embrace strategic persistence because more family
members are included in business operation, while these members are natural agents of 
family traditions. Although arguably there may be some family members who are
unwilling to follow what other family members are doing, strong social connections 
among family members make these divergent behaviors more likely to be found, while 
strong family-centered norms may pose high social pressure upon those family members 
to conform (Pollak, 1985). Differently put, strong family connections and norms have the 











    
  
 
   









Combined, it is expected that the extent of strategic persistence in family business 
should increase when the business grows older, hence:
Hypothesis 2a: Within family firms, there is a positive relationship between firm age
and strategic persistence. 
Organizational slack 
One reason behind strategic persistence is parsimony in family business. 
Nevertheless, not all family firms are alike, as some may be more willing to lavishly
invest while others may not (Arregle et al., 2012). In particular, this essay proposes that 
family firms with higher organizational slack are less parsimonious thus less likely to 
persist with existing strategy. 
Organizational slack refers to organizational resources embedded in the firm as 
excess costs that are greater than those needed by the firm (Singh, 1986). Examples of 
organizational slack include excessive stocks of cash and liquidable assets or excessive
expenditures paid in seedlings and administrations (Greve, 2003). In this matter, firms 
may reserve more cash or employ more individuals than necessary to operate effectively
such that these slacks can provide a cushion or buffer from disruptions in output (Cyert &
March, 1963). As parsimony concerns the efficiency of resource utilization, a high level 
of organizational slack would signal a low level of parsimony (Mishina et al., 2004; Voss
et al., 2008). 
Following this rationale, organizational slack is expected to negatively relate to 
strategic persistence in family business. Indeed, increasing investment in organizational
slack would suggest that some family business are less parsimonious compared to others. 


















   
 
   
some may choose to do so anyway due to the reversal of reference or other potential 
threats to family-centered socio-emotional wealth (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2007, 2013). Given the fact that parsimony is one factor driving the rise of 
strategic persistence, the increase of organizational slack would be negatively associated 
with persistent decision-making in family business over time. Hence, it is expected that:
Hypothesis 2b: Within family firms, there is a negative relationship between 
organizational slack and strategic persistence. 
Family Ownership
Family ownership can work as a medium to transfer owning family’s goals and 
willingness into the business system. Nevertheless, publicly-traded firms often involve
non-family even institutional owners, whose goals are not always aligned with the 
owning family’s interest (Chrisman et al., 2012). For instance, non-family public
shareholders may be concerned with rent appropriation by majority family owners and 
oppose to strategic decisions may would strengthen the family’s power and legitimacy
(Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006; Anderson et al., 2009; Morck & Young, 2003; Young et 
al., 2008). In addition, non-family and especially institutional owners are primarily
concerned with organizational profitability, which often relates to innovation and 
corporate venturing. Although these non-family owners and stakeholders are not as 
powerful as owning families in publicly- firms (Carney, 2005), their presence still works 
as hindrance to mitigate family’s influence on strategic decision-making (Arregle et al., 
2012). On the other hand, high family ownership would weaken the bargaining power of




















   
 
 
   
 
   
strategic persistence becomes more likely given high family ownership in publicly-traded 
family firms, meaning:
Hypothesis 2c: Within family firms, there is a positive relationship between family
ownership and strategic persistence. 
Hypothesis Development: Strategic Persistence and Firm Performance in Family 
and Non-family Businesses 
Given the higher strategic persistence in family firms compared to non-family
ones, it is natural to ask how strategic persistence affects firm’s performance in family
business. The following section intends to discuss about the linkage between strategic 
persistence and economic performance in family businesses.   
Strategic persistence may be harmful to organizations (Zajac & Kraatz, 1993; 
Zajac et al., 2000). In this sense, strategic change may represent organizational adaption 
to changing conditions either within or outside of the organization. Indeed, sustainable
performance requires organizational responses that maintain the alignment of the firm's 
strategy, structure and ideology with the demands of an evolving and changing
environment (Hedberg, Bystrom & Starbuck, 1976). In addition, change may reflect 
experimentation and risk-taking (Carpenter, 2000; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Zhang, 
2006). Thus, change may be a consequence of bold thinking and pursuit of novel strategic 
alternatives, which may help achieve superior performance (Haveman, 1992; Zajac &
Kraatz, 1993; Zajac et al., 2000). Finally, strategic change is essential in organization 
turnaround as successful turnarounds require managers to initiate change that is
consistent with organizational and environmental situations (Baker & Duhaime, 1997).
Nonetheless, it is inaccurate to claim strategic persistence is always harmful. 


















   
     
strategy on firm performance depends upon its fit with organizational resources and the
environment (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Miles & Snow, 1994; Sirmon et al., 2011). 
Resources influence the competitive position of organizations (Barney, 1991). On the 
other hand, resources must be structured and leveraged according to the requests
associated with a strategic decision (Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Sirmon et al., 2007). Here, 
structuring involves the processes of acquiring, accumulating, and deploying focal 
resources, while leveraging includes the processes of mobilizing and coordinating
resources (Sirmon et al., 2011). For instance, firms need to purchase new resources, 
deploy existing resources or change the structure of existing resources in order to extend
their product lines or change the firm’s product portfolios (Barney, 1991; Karim &
Mitchell, 2000).  
Concerning strategic persistence, making persistent decisions may lead to above-
average performance when an existing resource portfolio is path-dependent and thus 
appropriate only to a unique strategic choice (Patel & Pavitt, 1997). Furthermore, 
strategic persistence is favorable when it is hard to re-structure, organize or redeploy
(Karim & Mitchell, 2000). In the end, the benefits of strategic persistence may arise when 
it is costly to leverage resources within the company (Sirmon et al., 2007). Conversely,
family business features the interaction between the family unit, the business unit, and 
individual family members, making its resources specific, inseparable and intangible 
(Habbershon et al., 2003). Being specific means existing resources are path-dependent 
and cannot support the development of a new strategic choice (Habbershon et al., 2003). 
Being inseparable means that family members often have emotional attachment to these




   
 






   
 
 
    
    
   
  
   
  
result in great internal resistance (Gedajlovic et al., 2004). Intangibility suggests that 
some family-centered resources do not have a physical presence and thus cannot be easily
re-leveraged (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). As will be discussed in the next section, this
essay espouses the view that the combination of specificity, inseparability and 
intangibility makes strategic persistence generally more valuable in family business than 
that in non-family business. 
Resources in Family Business
Besides family-centered goals and family-centered governance, a family’s 
influence on business may also arise through the family’s endowment of resources. 
Family business researchers recognize that the interaction of family units, business units, 
and individual members, (Gersick, et al., 1997) can lead to competitive advantages in
some family firms (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Habbershon et al., 2003; Pearson et 
al., 2008). For instance, Habbershon and Williams (1999) and Habbershon et al. (2003)
argue that a family’s involvement in businesses may bring in distinctive resources 
unavailable to non-family firms, such as those based on human, social, patient, 
survivability, and governance capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). The follow-up literature
further suggests that family governance may have advantage over non-family governance
in the process of creating, accumulating and managing resources (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), 
such as family and kinship networks (Lester & Cannella, 2006), intangible knowledge
(Cabrera-Suárez, Saá-Pérez & García-Almeida, 2001), reputation (Dyer, 2006) and social 
capital (Pearson et al., 2008). While these resources may take variant forms, they all






















   
Specificity
Specificity means that the effectiveness of some resources is dependent on the 
local environment (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993). When resources become specific (e.g., 
tooling used to manufacture a single product), they become valuable only to that specific
context and costly to redeploy without loss in value (Riordan & Williamson, 1985; 
Williamson, 1999). 
In family businesses, resource specificity means that most of the family-endowed
resources are path-dependent and cannot be easily used for purposes other than those for
which they were originally designed (Habbershon et al., 2003). For instance, family firms 
often rely on family members to take key managerial positions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2003). Positive attributes of family human resources include extraordinary commitment, 
and warm, friendly and intimate relationships (Donnelley, 1964; Horton, 198). 
On the other hand, the accumulation of family human resources depends upon
family members’ early childhood involvement and long-term learning-by-doing in the
family firm (Chirico et al., 2011; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). In particular, family members’
simultaneous participation in both business and family relationships make the
accumulation of family human resources unique and distinctive from the case in non-
family firms. In this regard, knowledge aligned with these family members is often path-
dependent, meaning that these human resources are often contingent upon a particular
way of running business and can no longer be valuable under a different context (Sirmon 
et al., 2008). Another example is patient capital, defined as financial assets invested 
without threat of liquidation for long periods (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Patient capital stems 


















   
   
firms, as family firms often look into the longer future planning its strategies and 
operations (Zellweger, 2007). This would suggest that the current utilization of patient 
capital is planned in the past and cannot be easily altered at present. Therefore, the 
resource portfolio in family business may not be supportive to any change that diverges 
from existing strategic choice (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011).  
Nonetheless, having resource specificity does not mean strategic change is 
impossible. The focal firm can always change its resource portfolio by divesting old 
and/or acquiring new resources, or re-leveraging existing resources by de-coupling old 
bundles and/or creating new ones. As will be further elaborated, this is not the case in 
family business due to the combination of resource inseparability and resource
intangibility. 
Inseparability
Inseparability means that it is rather costly to separate the family’s involvement 
from its endowment of resources. Indeed, in order to get resources from the family
system, there must be some level of family involvement in business (Habbershon et al., 
2003). However, making strategic change (and being non-persistent) often requires the 
shedding of old resources and acquiring of new resources; thus the portfolio of 
organizational resources may better fit the newly-developed strategy (Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003). However, family members as well as the whole family may have emotional 
attachment for family-endowed resources (König et al., 2013). Emotional ties among
family members make shedding old and acquiring new resource less likely. As an 
example, compared to non-family counterparts, family firms are less likely to end the 






















2010; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). Nonetheless, under high pressure family owners may
be willing to unbind their emotional attachments, but often demand higher economic
compensations to do so. For instance, family owners often ask for higher prices to sell
their businesses (Zellweger et al., 2012). 
In addition, family owners may oppose acquisition of new resources from non-
family parties, because doing so may potentially dilute family’s influence and mitigate 
family’s attachment to the business. In the end, even with new resource investment 
family decision-makers may choose to strengthen existing business routines rather than 
initiating new ones. In comparison, due to lower extent of emotional attachment, 
shedding old resources and acquiring new ones would be easier and less costly in the
setting of non-family business. 
Therefore, it appears that the feature of resource inseparability makes obtaining
new resources and/or shedding old resources difficult in family firms. Given the fact that 
strategic change often requires the revision of existing resource portfolio to support its 
implementation, persisting old strategic choices become a better option to reach superior
performance.  
Intangibility 
Recent work distinguishes tangible resources (e.g., people, machinery, financial 
capital) from intangible, knowledge-based resources (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1992). In this 
instance, intangibility refers to the fact that some resources have no actual physical 
presence. Examples of intangible resources include organizing principles, skills, and 
processes that direct organizational actions (Kogut & Zander, 1996). In family business, 
















   






which are largely possessed, shared and transferred among family members (Cabrera-
Suárez et al., 2001). In comparison, non-family firms are often characterized by
professional and explicit knowledge that non-family executives learn from educational 
institutions.   
Family-centered intangible resources are important to family business, as they
work as high-order managerial principals to coordinate activities and manage other 
resources (Carney, 2005; Kogut & Zander, 1996). Nevertheless, these intangible
resources also have limitations. For example, they depend on the endowment of the 
owning family and cannot be directly purchased from external factor markets (Barney, 
1986; Pearson et al., 2008). In addition, these resources cannot be codified and easily
transferred, and often requires the buildup of shared understanding and trust either
between family and non-family members or among family members (Cabrera-Suárez et 
al., 2001; Von Krogh et al., 2000). In the end, these family-centered resources are
accumulated through either learning-by-doing or social interactions, but often limited
among family members only (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).
Under the condition of resource intangibility, frequent strategic changes become
less valuable. Indeed, the creation of competitive advantage through strategic change
depends upon the successful de-bundling of old resources and re-bundling of new 
resources (Barney, 1991; Sirmon et al., 2007). Different from shedding old resources 
and/or acquiring new ones discussed above, this one concerns the re-leveraging of 
existing resource portfolio (Barney & Arikan, 2001). On the other hand, because family-
centered intangible resources are difficult to transmit and their transmissions are often 

















   
 
 
   
 
 
(Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). For instance, strategic change often requires the inclusion 
of new non-family professionals to lead or assist initiatives in business. However, these
non-family members cannot easily understand family-centered traditions and routines 
(Chrisman et al., 2014). In addition, besides the problem of understanding, the presence
of family heuristics makes the adoption of new practices difficult in family business 
(Gedajlovic et al., 2004), as family members would resist in accepting non-family
practices whereas non-family members would resist in family practices. This would 
suggest that the feature of resource intangibility makes strategic change a less optimal
option because re-structuring of existing resources becomes difficult thus costly.
In sum, being specific, inseparable and intangible makes it difficult to re-
structure, leverage or redeploy resources in family business (Sirmon et al., 2007). Thus, 
resource portfolio in family business is path-dependent and appropriate only to existing
strategic choice (Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Patel & Pavitt, 1997). That is, in family
business strategic persistence should lead to the increase of firm performance. In formal 
terms: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive interaction between family business and strategic
persistence on firm performance.  
Hypothesis Development: The Moderating Effect of Family Management
Specificity, inseparability and intangibility are interdependent. On the one hand, 
being inseparable and intangible makes some family-endowed resources specific. Indeed, 
when the resource endowment of a business is not linked to family involvement, non-
family managers can easily substitute family managers, because these resources in 




     
  








   





   
instance, resource specificity may result in high transaction costs of strategic change only
when resource inseparability and intangibility are high. However, specificity, 
inseparability and intangibility are endogenously developed as their saliences all
associate with the family’s involvement in business, especially the family’s participation 
in firm management. That is, specificity, inseparability and intangibility of family-
endowed resources increase when family involvement in management increases. In 
particular, family management may signal the organization’s reliance upon the family’s 
provision of resources (Gedajlovic et al., 2004); meaning the path-dependence nature
(specificity) of resources would arise aligned with family management. In addition, 
family involvement in management can represent the family’s intention to maintain 
control over business, which should directly relate to its psychological and emotional 
attachments to family-endowed resources (Arregle et al., 2007). In the end, family
managers are agents not only transmitting family-centered intangible resources to the
business system, but also structuring and leveraging these resources in the business 
system (Chirico et al., 2011). All taken, it would suggest that resource specificity, 
inseparability and intangibility all result from family involvement in management. Given 
the rationale of H3, the positive effect of strategic persistence on firm performance in 
family firms should be more salient in those with higher family management than those
with lower family management. In another word: 
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive interaction between family management and 























The sample is composed of manufacturing firms listed in the S&P 1500 index
from 1996 to 2013 with at least five years of continuous information on the firm 
available. Utility and service firms are excluded owing to differences in government 
regulation and feasible strategic actions of these firms compared to manufacturing firms.
Such exclusion ensures greater homogeneity in the sample. The focus is on 1996 to 2013 
because it covers the “Internet Bubble” and financial crisis periods in which firms’ 
strategic decisions would be likely to vary. Hence, strategic persistence and firm 
performance should have sufficient variations in the sample. Such a long range also 
means that there are enough time-series observations to ensure that the measure of 
strategic persistence is meaningful. In addition, this range covers periods used in previous
studies on family businesses (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester &
Cannella, 2007) and observations in recent years. Firms without at least five years of
continuous information are excluded, because strategic persistence by nature requires 
sustained operations over an extended period of time. 
The data are longitudinal in nature. To identify founding families, and the role of 
those families in a firm (as part of the top management team and/or board of directors),
Hoover’s, ExecuComp, Fundinguniverse.com, ancestry.com, firm websites, as well as 
company proxy statements were examined. Measures related to corporate governance and 
family business -such as family ownership and family management- are obtained from 
firm proxy annual reports. Other variables, including strategic persistence, primarily











   
 








between the dependent variable and other variables are used. Also for all models, the
dependent variable(s) are adjusted by industry-average(s), thus industry-specific effects 
can be mitigated. 
In total, the primary sample includes 682 firms representing 5,048 firm-year 
observations from 1996 to 2013 for further analysis. Note that the actual sample size for
each model greatly varies due to missing data and the loss of time-series observations in 
calculating strategic persistence.  
Independent and Dependent Variables
The primary independent variable is family business. Although the definition of
family business is still debated (Chrisman et al., 2005; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), the 
literature generally measures family business via some combination of family ownership 
and family management. Thus, family business is defined by a family’s involvement in 
ownership and management and a vision for how the firm benefits the family, potentially
across generations (e.g. Chua et al., 1999). This definition implies that family
management is at least as important as family ownership, because it is the medium 
through which the owning family can transmit its goals and endow its resources into the 
firm’s operation (Chrisman et al., 2012). 
Consistent with this definition, family business is measured as a binary variable in 
which 1 indicates that the focal firm has at least 5 % family ownership, at least two 
family members who are or have been employed as significant owners, top managers, or





















    
 





TMT7 8 9(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2013; 
Miller et al., 2007). All firms that do not meet these conditions are considered non-family
firms and are coded as 0. Such a measurement highlights that multiple family members 
are or have been involved in the company, which may signal the presence of intra-family
succession intention. Such a measurement also ensures family’s involvement in both 
ownership and management, which may represent the family’s ability in transferring
family-centered visions into firm strategic behaviors. In addition, this measurement 
differentiate family firms from either lone-founder firms which by definition do not have
multiple family members involved in the business, or from non-family blockholder-
controlled firms in which the significant owners are neither family members nor 
founders. 
Also, Gomez-Mejia and colleagues (2011, p659) notes that, “the potential 
existence of unknown threshold effects also poses a problem when relying on continuous 
measures of ownership. For example, holding 5% or more of a firm’s shares in a Fortune
500 company may convey a dominant position, and owning an additional 20% or 30% of 
the shares may not make much difference in terms of influence over the firm’s affairs 
(Tosi et al., 1999)”. Thus, this study chooses not to use a continuous measure of family
7, Family business is also measured by at least 5 % family ownership, at least two family
members currently or historically involved, and either family CEO or family chairman as an 
alternative measure of family business. Regression results are similar to the primary results. 
8, Family business is also measured by at least 5 % family ownership and at least two family
members currently involved in TMT. Such a measure may signal the presence of intra-family
succession intention in the family. Regression results are discussed in the robustness tests. 
9, Family business is also measured by the number of family managers in TMT if there is at
least 5 % family ownership, at least two family members currently or historically involved, 
and at least one family managers in TMT. Such a measure is continuous in nature and may
better capture the variance of family’s involvement in business.  Regression results are




















    
ownership to proxy the extent of family’s involvement in business. As will be further
discussed in the post hoc tests, it is found that family ownership may have a non-linear 
relationship with strategic persistence or its effect may be contingent upon other factors. 
Strategic Persistence is defined as the continuation of similar patterns in resource
allocations in key strategic dimensions over time (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; 
Hambrick, Geletkanycz & Fredrickson, 1993). There are two issues worth noting about 
this definition. First, strategic persistence should cover multiple strategic areas rather than 
focus on a single area. Second, strategic persistence should be measured across a 
relatively long time window. 
To deal with the first issue, six key strategic dimensions are used: (1) advertising
intensity (advertising/ sales), (2) research and development intensity (R&D/sales), (3) 
plant and equipment newness (net P&E/gross P&E), (4) non-production overhead
(selling, general, and administrative [SGA] expenses/sales), (5) inventory levels 
(inventories/ sales), and (6) financial leverage (debt/equity). These dimensions have been
used in previous studies to capture the general pattern of strategic decision-making in 
each firm (Carpenter, 2000; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Zhang, 2006).
For the second issue, the standard deviations of the variables over the most recent 
ten year period are calculated. Note that strategic persistence is used as a dependent
variable in testing for H1 and H2a-c, and used as an independent variable in testing for
H3 and H4. When it is used as dependent variable, the standard deviation of ten years in 
the future (year t~ year t+9) is used, while in the case of independent variable, ten years 














   
  




causality in the analyses. As a robustness test, a five year window is used for an 
alternative measure of strategic persistence. 
It should be noted that the standard deviation is empirically different from the 
mean of the variable over time or the stock value of the variable in a given year. The
former captures the dynamic variation over time, while the latter measures are static in 
nature. For instance, it is possible for a company to have a high amount of R&D 
investment in a given year, but low variation across time if the company persists in high 
R&D investments.     
After that, all six variables are standardized (Mean= 0 and S.D. =1). Then mean of 
all six variables was calculated, which represents the average of variation of strategic 
actions across the ten-year window. Then, because persistence is opposite to variation in 
definition, the reverse value of the average (i.e. -0.5 is reversed into 0.5) was used to 
create the measure of strategic persistence. Such a treatment ensures that if the focal firm-
year observation has above-average strategic persistence, its value should be higher than 
0. Similarly, if the observation has below-average strategic persistence, its value should 
be lower than 0. In the end, to ensure industry-specific effects were considered by
adjusting this measure by industry-average. 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (market value to assets adjusted by industrial average
as computed by Chung & Pruitt, 1994) is used as the measure of firm performance. This 
measure has been widely used in the family business literature (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
























Firm age is calculated as the number of years that a company has been operating
in the market. Firm age is also used as a control variable in testing H3 and H4 as firm 
performance may vary according to the time that the firm has been operating. 
Organizational slack is defined as organizational resources that are more than 
what actually needed (Singh, 1986). Aligned with the definition, organizational slack is
calculated as the ratio of liquid asset (reserved cash and marketable securities) divided by
sales (Tan & Peng, 2003). Similar to firm age, this variable is added as a control variable 
in testing for H3 and H4, as organizational slack often affects the variation of firm 
performance. 
Family ownership is measured as the overall percentage of family ownership 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004). It is different from the family business measure such that this 
variable is continuous. Note that although family ownership has been used to classify
family and non-family firms, it still significantly varies in family firms. This feature
allows the test of H2c as some family firms may have higher family ownership compared 
to others. Also, note that this variable is used to test for H2c, as the emphasis here is on
the variation of family ownership in the family business population only. Thus, any firm 
with less than 5% family ownership is not included in the analysis. 
Family management is measured as the number of family members among the 
Top Management Team (TMT). The number of the sum of family members on the board 
of director (BOD) and family TMT members is also used as an alternative measure of 
family management for a robustness test. This alternative measure reflects the fact that 
family board members may engage in monitoring thus may affect the implementation of 












   






     
   
Control Variables
As mentioned above, two independent variables (firm age and organizational 
slack) are used as control variables in regressing firm performance (H3 and H4). In 
addition, following Anderson and Reeb (2003, 2004) and Miller et al. (2007), a number
of control variables are included because of their potential influences on firm behaviors 
and performance. 
The variable of lone-founder firm is controlled, measured by a binary variable in 
which 1 denotes the situation where the one-founder has at least 5% ownership (Miller et 
al., 2007). Note that lone-founder firms are differentiated from family firms as the latter 
must have at least two family members historically involved in the business. In addition,
note that lone-founder firms and family firms are mutually exclusive, thus this variable is 
not included in testing hypotheses for the family business sample (H2a-H2c & H4).  
Non-family blockholder ownership, measured as the overall percentage of 
blockholder ownership in year t-1, is controlled as these non-family owners may have
concerns that are incompatible with the owning family’s interests (Morck et al., 2005). 
Note that these blockholder may be representative of institutional investors as their 
presence is often affiliated with financial institutes. 
In addition, firm size (i.e., log of the number of sales in year t-1, Anderson &
Reeb, 2003, 2004), debt ratio (debt-to-asset ratio measured as a ratio in year t-1) and firm 
risk (the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous three years, Anderson &
Reeb, 2003) are also controlled, as these factors often affect the decision-making process 





   
  




   




      
    
   
  
                                                 
   
    
This study also includes five out of six strategic actions mentioned above for each 
given period, namely advertising intensity (advertising/ sales in t-1 period), R&D 
intensity (R&D/sales in t-1 period), plant and equipment newness (net P&E/gross P&E in 
t-1 period), inventory level (inventories/sales in t-1 period), and financial leverage
(debt/equity in t-1 period), all measured as ratios. Indeed, strategic actions in the past may
affect strategic decisions in future, as firms are often path-dependent in their patterns of
decision-making. It should be noted that the independent variable is calculated based on 
the S.D.s of these variables across a ten-year window, whereas the controls are calculated 
as their static values in year t-1. Also, note that the measure of SGA ratio (selling, 
general, and administrative [SGA] expenses/sales) is not included. This is because this 
variable is often used as a measure of organizational slack and may therefore be
theoretically redundant as this study has already included a measure of organizational
slack10. Because corporations often diversified into foreign markets, this study also 
includes a measure of international sales calculated by the percentage of sales coming
from foreign domains in year t-1. As performance may also affect strategic decisions in 
family business, this study controls for past performance (ROA in t-1 term). Industrial
affiliation is also controlled by industrial average performance, measured as industry
averages of ROA at the four-digit SIC codes in year t-1. Finally, the inverse Mills ratio
calculated to control for endogeneity is added as an additional control for all models. 
10, Empirically, SGA ratio and the measure of organizational slack show a high level of






















It is possible that endogeneity may make the regression estimates biased. This 
study uses two approaches to control for endogeneity. First, as mentioned above, one-
year lag is used between the dependent variable and others to ensure the direction of 
causality, thus the probability of reverse causality is mitigated. Second, the Heckman’s 
(1979) two-stage technique (see Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) is also used. The key here is 
to find instrumental variables that are highly related to the independent variable (family
business measure) but are unrelated to the dependent variables. Put differently, high 
quality instrumental variables in this instance should be family firm specific and not 
strongly connected to either strategic action or firm performance. 
This study uses four instrumental variables. First, this study uses family trust-
holdings affiliated with the largest owner in the firm in a given year, measured as a binary
variable in which 1 denotes the situation that the owner holds either trusts or foundations 
associated with family members and 0 otherwise. Indeed, founders, family owners and 
other major shareholders often choose to use trust or foundation to take care of their 
family members. Note that the establishment of trust-holding may be driven by superior
firm performance. Nonetheless, as one-year lags are used between dependent variable and
other variables, the direction of causality is ensured. In addition, theoretically family
trust-holding can be a signal of the owning family’s vision such that the business is used 
to ensure the benefit of the whole family as well as individual family members. Thus, the
inclusion of this instrumental variable also helps to ensure the presence of family-


















Second, this study controls for the fraction of industry sales that comes from 
family firms (i.e. family firm sales fraction by industry), which is naturally related to the
probability that a firm in the industry is such a firm, yet is independent of the second 
stage dependent variables (strategic persistence and Tobin’Q) because the latter are
industry-adjusted. Similar measures have been used in previous studies in family business 
(Amit et al., 2015) and finance (Campa & Kedia, 2002). Third, this study also controls 
for family firms’ fraction of capital expenditure by industry (i.e. family firm capital 
fraction by industry). Lastly, family firms’ fraction of advertisement expenditure by
industry (i.e. family firm advertisement fraction by industry) is also controlled. Note that 
within three family firm fraction variables, one is related to performance (sales) and the
other two are related to decision-making. Such a design is appropriate because the 
hypotheses are related to both strategic persistence and firm performance. Using
Heckman’s two-stage procedure, this study first estimates one probit model in which 
family business (=1) versus non-family firm (=0) is regressed against four instrumental 
variables and other controls mentioned above. According to the estimation results, the
inverse Mills ratio is calculated for each yearly-firm observation and included as a control 
in all models. 
Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 1. In general, 23% of 
the sample are family firms, while 9% are lone-founder firms. These numbers are similar 
to other studies exploring publicly traded lone-founder and family firms (Miller et al., 
2007). In addition, consistent with Chrisman and Patel (2012), as well as Miller and 




















correlated with R&D investments. Thus, it appears that the sample is comparable to other
family business studies in publicly traded firms.  Although the correlation between family
business and strategic persistence is not significant (0.00 in 5 years period; 0.05 in 10 
years periods), family management appears to have positive and significant relationships 
with strategic persistence (0.03 in 5 years period; 0.01 in 10 years periods). Also 
consistent with expectations, strategic persistence is negatively correlated with firm 
performance. In terms of the selection of instrumental variables, all four variables are
positively and significantly related to family business variable(s). In addition, their 
correlations with family business variable(s) are much higher compared to their
correlations with either strategic persistence or firm performance, which are largely not 
significant11 (Table 1). All of these provide initial support that the selection of
instrumental variables is appropriate. The highest variance inflation factor (VIF) is 2.78, 
suggesting that multi-collinearity is not a major concern. 
11, Z-statistics reveal that the smallest difference between instrumental variables’ correlation 
with family business variable and their correlation with strategic persistence or performance























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    
 
  
Due to the nature of longitudinal data, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
analysis may yield biased estimations. The Hausman test (Chi Sq Statistic=303.90, P-
Value<0.001) suggests that the fixed effect model is more appropriate than the random-
effect. Thus, fixed-effect longitudinal regression is used as the primary analytic 
technique. In order to control for potential serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, 
Huber-White estimator clustered at the firm level is also used (Judson & Owen, 1999). In 
all models, a one year lag between dependent and other variables is used. 
As mentioned above, this study uses Heckman’s two-stage approach to partially
control for endogeneity. Model 1 (Table 2) is the first-stage probit treatment model in 
which the binary variable of family business is regressed against instrumental variables 
and other controls. Lone-founder firms are not included as a control as this category is 
mutually exclusive from the family business variable. Overall, four instrumental variables 
are all positively and significantly related to the family business variable, suggesting that 
the selection of instruments is reasonable (Table 2, Model 1). 
Model 2 (Table 2) tests H1. Firm risk (B= -0.002, p-value<0.001), plant newness 
(B= -0.225, p-value<0.001) and international sales (B= -0.0001, p-value<0.001) are
negatively related to strategic persistence. In support of H1, the family business variable
is positively (B= 0.047, p-value<0.001) related to strategic persistence. This means that, 
ceteris paribus, being a family business increases the extent of strategic persistence by
0.047 units compared to case of non-family business. Thus, the result indicates that 
family firms tend to be more persistent in strategic decision-making compared to non-
family firms. It should also be noted that the estimated coefficients of lone-founder firms 



















of family ownership, it suggests that the result found here is not due to the effect of 
ownership concentration.
Model 3 (Table 2) tests H2a-H2c. Note that while H1 intends to address the
difference between family and non-family businesses, H2a-H2c aim at exploring the 
heterogeneity in the family business population. Thus, Model 2 (Table 2) focuses on 
family firms only, and the control variable of lone-founder firm is taken out because this
type of organization is mutually exclusive from family business. 
In support of H2a and H2b, firm age (B= 0.011, p-value<0.001) is positively
related to strategic persistence, while organizational slack (B= -0.002, p-value<0.001) is 
negatively related to strategic persistence. 
Nevertheless, H2c is not supported as the family ownership (B= -0.375, p-
value>0.10) variable is negatively but not significantly related to strategic persistence. 
Thus, it appears that in the family business population, family ownership does not have a
linear and positive relationship with strategic persistence. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, it
is possible that family ownership may have a non-linear impact upon the exercise of






    





        
     
       
       
       
      
      
        
        
       
        
       
       
       
        
       
       
       
       
       
      
          
        
        
    
    
     
        
     







   
 
  
Table 2 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, H1-H2c
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3





Sample FB & NFB FB & NFB FB
Constant -1.622*** 0.058 0.405
Family Business (H1) 0.047***
Firm Age (H2a) -0.0004 0.011**
Organizational Slack (H2b) -0.004** -0.002***
Family Ownership (H2c) -0.0002
Lone-founder Firm 0.029
Blockholder Ownership -0.020*** 0.000 -0.003***
Firm Size -0.160*** 0.004 -0.096*
Debt Ratio 1.736*** -0.078 -0.378
Firm Risk -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.001
Advertisement Ratio 0.506 -0.295 -0.192
R&D Ratio -2.001*** -0.981 -0.190
Plant Newness 0.456 -0.225*** -0.142†
Inventory Ratio 0.000 0.400 -0.196
Leverage Ratio 0.326 -0.004 0.012**
International Sales 0.001 -0.0001*** 0.001
Past Performance -0.570 -0.005 -0.184†
Industrial Average Performance 0.438 0.015 -0.109
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.023 0.024
Family Trust-Holdings 2.219***
Family Sales Ratio by Industry 1.408***
Family Advertisement Ratio by Industry 0.352***
Family Capital Ratio by Industry 0.419*
Cross-section 682 682 164 
Periods 9 9 9 
Sample Size 5,048 5,048 1,092
Within R Square 0.57 0.30 0.10
F-statistics 9.30*** 25.47***
Absolute Log Likelihood 2300.65***
Note: 
1) Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2) † p < .10;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3) Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
Model 4 (Table 3) tests H3. The family business variable (B= -0.240, p-
value<0.05) is negatively related to firm performance. Strategic persistence (B= -0.130, 
p-value>0.10) has a negative but not significant effect on firm performance. In support of
H3, the interaction between the family business variable and strategic persistence is 


















strategic decision-making may help improve performance in family owned and managed 
organizations. Model 5 (Table 3) tests H4. Supporting H4, the interaction between 
strategic persistence and family management is positive and significant (B= 0.258, p-
value<0.05). It appears that family firms with high levels of family management 
primarily capture the positive effect of strategic persistence. 
Figure 1 plots Model 3. It appears that, non-family firms have higher performance 
compared to family firms. In addition, the increase of strategic persistence is not
associated with salient change in firm performance in non-family firms. In support of H3, 
there is a positive relationship between strategic persistence and firm performance in 
family business. Indeed, given the high level of strategic persistence, the performance
difference between family and non-family firms becomes minimized. 
Figure 2 plots Model 4. Similar to Figure 1, it appears that strategic persistence
has a positive effect on firm performance given high family’s involvement in 
management. Supporting H4, when strategic persistence approaches a relatively high 






   
     
     
    
     
     
    
        
      
      
     
     
      
      
     
      
     
     
     
      
     
    
     
     
       
    
     
     
      
   
 
    
    
  
Table 3 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, H3-H4
Model Model 4 Model 5
Dependent Variable Firm Performance FirmPerformance




Strategic Persistence -0.130 -0.351
Family Business * Strategic Persistence (H3) 0.130*
Family Management * Strategic Persistence (H4) 0.258*
Firm Age -0.011 0.014
Organizational Slack 0.049*** 0.003
Lone-founder Firm 0.137
Blockholder Ownership 0.006 -0.001
-Firm Size -0.503*** 0.367***
Debt Ratio -0.413 -0.265
Firm Risk 0.010*** 0.006*
Advertisement Ratio -1.726 -3.480
R&D Ratio -1.323 -5.233*
Plant Newness -0.931*** -0.376
Inventory Ratio -0.631* -0.449
Leverage Ratio 0.000 0.004
International Sales 0.004 -0.013**
Past Performance 1.009*** 1.717***
-Industrial Average Performance -0.599* 1.336***
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.048** -0.034
Cross-section 669 133
Periods 7 7
Sample Size 4,056 713
Within R Square 0.21 0.31
F-statistics 12.87*** 7.61***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.





   Figure 1 Family Business, Strategic Persistence and Firm Performance
 
 






A number of robustness tests are conducted to ensure that the results are not 
artificial. Firstly, instead of a 10 year window, 5 years is used to calculate the variable of 
strategic persistence. Note that 10 years is intentionally chosen because such a long time 
range ensures that the measure of strategic persistence is not determined by short-term 










    
  






positively related to strategic persistence (Table 4, Model 6, B= 0.059, p-value<0.10), 
while the interaction between the family business variable and strategic persistence is
positively related to firm performance (Table 5, Model 8, B= 0.074, p-value<0.01). 
Nevertheless, among H2a-H2c (Table 4, Model 7), only H2c (positive relationship 
between family ownership and strategic persistence) is supported. Neither firm age
(Model 7, B= 0.072, p-value >0.10) or organizational slack (Model 7, B= - 0.0001, p-
value >0.10) are significantly related to strategic persistence, though the coefficients are
in the hypothesized directions. In addition, H4 is not supported, as the coefficient of the
interaction between family management and strategic persistence (Model 8, B= 0.107, p-
value >0.10) is positive but nonsignificant. Thus, the basic conceptual idea (family firms 
tend to be more persistent and strategic persistence is more likely to result in superior
performance in family business compared to non-family business) is reasonably robust, 
although hypotheses related to the heterogeneity among family business population are













     
     
      
     
     
      
     
      
      
     
      
     
     
     
      
     
     
     
     
       
    
   
    
      
    
 
    




                                                 
  
 
Table 4 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests H1-H2c








Sample FB & NFB FB
Constant -0.671 -2.417
Family Business (H1) 0.059†
Firm Age (H2a) -0.072
Organizational Slack (H2b) 0.000
Family Ownership (H2c) 0.008*
Lone-founder Firm -0.024
Blockholder Ownership 0.004* 0.011
Firm Size 0.131* 0.871†
Debt Ratio -0.062 -0.657
Firm Risk -0.002** 0.003†
Advertisement Ratio -0.502 0.392
R&D Ratio -1.277*** -0.544
Plant Newness -0.324*** -1.055*
Inventory Ratio 0.303† 1.714†
Leverage Ratio 0.001 -0.029
International Sales 0.000† 0.000
Past Performance 0.014 -0.009
Industrial Average Performance -0.195 -0.280
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.005 -0.008
Cross-section 794 179
Periods 14 14
Sample Size 8,785 1,747
Within R Square 0.15 0.15
F-statistics 5.56*** 3.73***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
Furthermore, performance measure is changed from industry-adjusted Tobin’Q
into industry-adjusted ROA12. Indeed, Tobin’s Q reflects more about the stock market’s 
12, This study also uses industry-adjusted ROS. Results are similar to industry-adjusted ROA






   
     
     
    
     
     
      
          
       
      
     
     
      
      
     
      
     
     
     
      
     
     
     
     
       
    
   
     
     
   
 
    
    
  
  
perception of the firm value, while ROA is more about the firm’s yearly profitability. 
Again, both H3 (Table 6, Model 10) and H4 (Table 6, Model 11) are supported. 
Table 5 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests H3-H4
Model Model 8 Model 9
Dependent Variable Firm Performance FirmPerformance




Strategic Persistence (Five Years) -0.062*** 0.121
Family Business * Strategic Persistence (Five Years) (H3) 0.075**
Family Management * Strategic Persistence (Five Years) (H4) -0.107
Firm Age -0.012 0.027*
Organizational Slack 0.000*** -0.007
Lone-founder Firm -0.220**
Blockholder Ownership 0.005† 0.007
Firm Size -0.467*** -0.225*
Debt Ratio -0.978*** 0.684
Firm Risk 0.019*** -0.001
Advertisement Ratio -1.295 -5.616***
R&D Ratio -1.594† -2.066
Plant Newness -0.466 0.309
Inventory Ratio -0.412*** -0.177
Leverage Ratio 0.001 -0.0003*
International Sales 0.001*** -0.003
Past Performance 1.412*** 2.143***
Industrial Average Performance -0.931** -1.311***
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.001 -0.006
Cross-section 787 172
Periods 12 12
Sample Size 7,642 1,410
Within R Square 0.21 0.22
F-statistics 11.94*** 17.19***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.





   
     
     
    
     
     
     
         
      
      
     
     
      
      
     
      
     
     
     
      
     
     
     
     
       
     
     
     
     
   
 
    






Table 6 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H3-H4
Model Model 10 Model 11
Dependent Variable Firm Performance(Industry-Adjusted ROA)




Strategic Persistence -0.002** -0.033
Family Business * Strategic Persistence (H3) 0.023***
Family Management * Strategic Persistence (H4) 0.033*
Firm Age 0.000 0.000
Organizational Slack -0.008 -0.029†
Lone-founder Firm 0.013
Blockholder Ownership 0.0003* -0.002*
Firm Size -0.010** -0.015
Debt Ratio 0.148*** 0.007
Firm Risk 0.000 0.000
Advertisement Ratio -0.010 -0.110
R&D Ratio 0.135 -0.284
Plant Newness -0.014 -0.064†
Inventory Ratio -0.019 -0.056*
Leverage Ratio 0.000 0.0001**
International Sales 0.000 0.000
Past Performance 0.447*** 0.300**
Industrial Average Performance -0.490*** -0.036
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.003† 0.005
Cross-section 669 136
Periods 7 8
Sample Size 4056 824
Within R Square 0.14 0.11
F-statistics 44.10*** 16.13***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
Furthermore, note that the measure of family business does not necessarily
captures the vision of the owning family. This may suggest an isolation between the 
definition and the measurement. Here, two alternative measures of family business are

















To begin, instead of one family manager, this study uses at least two family
managers in TMT to classify family business, aligned with at least 5% family ownership 
and at least two family members historically or currently involved in business. Such a
measure highlights the presence of multiple family members in TMT, which may signal 
the presence of intra-family succession intention. Consistent with the primary analysis, 
H1 (Table 7, Model 12) and H3 (Table 8, Model 14) are supported. 
In addition, family business is measured by the number of family managers in 
business if there is at least 5% family ownership and at least two family members 
historically or currently involved in business. This measure is continuous in nature and 
may better reflect the variance of family involvement in business. Also note that family
managers are directly involved in daily-management in business. This issue is important 
as publicly-traded firms feature the isolation between ownership and management, thus 
family ownership may not have direct effect on firm decision-making. In addition, the 
number of family managers may better capture the vision of the owning family, as more
family managers may signal a higher intention of maintaining family’s control in
business possibly across generations. Again, both H1 (Table 7, Model 13) and H3 (Table 





   
   
 
 
       
     
        
    
      
      
      
     
      
    
     
     
      
     
     
     
     
       
   
   
   
     
   
 
  
   
  
  
Table 7 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H1




Sample FB & NFB FB & NFB
Constant 0.059 0.052
Family Business (>=2 family managers, H1) 0.085**
Family Management (H1) 0.037**
Lone-founder Firm 0.029 0.030
Blockholder Ownership 0.000 0.000
Firm Size 0.004 0.004
Debt Ratio -0.077 -0.078†
Firm Risk -0.002*** -0.002***
Advertisement Ratio -0.295 -0.293
R&D Ratio -0.983 -0.983
Plant Newness -0.224*** -0.226***
Inventory Ratio 0.401 0.401
Leverage Ratio -0.004 -0.004
International Sales -0.0002*** -0.0001***
Past Performance -0.006 -0.007
Industrial Average Performance 0.013 0.015
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.022 -0.024
Cross-section 682 682
Periods 9 9
Sample Size 5,048 5,048
Within R Square 0.31 0.31
F-statistics 11.61*** 11.60***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.





   
    
  
 
       
     
        
     
    
      
     
   
    
      
     
      
      
      
     
      
     
     
     
      
     
     
     
     
       
   
   
   
     






   
Table 8 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H3




Sample FB & NFB FB & NFB
Constant 4.606** 4.683**
Family Business (>=2 family managers) -0.137**
Family Management -0.111*
Strategic Persistence 0.007 0.006
Family Business (>=2 family managers) * 
Strategic Persistence (H3) 0.209**
Family Management * 
Strategic Persistence (H3) 0.100** 
Firm Age -0.009 -0.009
Organizational Slack 0.050*** 0.049***
Lone-founder Firm 0.144 0.141
Blockholder Ownership 0.006 0.006
Firm Size -0.503*** -0.505***
Debt Ratio -0.417 -0.413
Firm Risk 0.010*** 0.010***
Advertisement Ratio -1.366 -1.579
R&D Ratio -1.353 -1.338
Plant Newness -0.922*** -0.916***
Inventory Ratio -0.733** -0.650*
Leverage Ratio 0.001 0.001
International Sales 0.004 0.004
Past Performance 0.839* 0.837*
Industrial Average Performance -0.167 -0.158
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.031† 0.042**
Cross-section 669 669
Periods 7 7
Sample Size 4,056 4,056
Within R Square 0.21 0.21
F-statistics 9.29*** 9.30***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
Lastly, this study also tries to use the sum of family TMT members and family
board of directors (BOD) members as an alternative measure of family management in 










   
  
   
    
   
      
    
   
    
    
   
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
     
   
  
    
    
  
 
    
    
  
in monitoring firm operations thus may have extensive influences on daily management. 
Again, H4 (Table 9, Model 16) is supported. 
To summarize, results of robustness tests show a high level of consistency with 
the primary results. 
Table 9 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H4
Model Model 16











































Within R Square 0.30
F-statistics 8.35***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.








    
   
   
 
 
   
   
     
    
     
      
      
      
      
     
      
     
     
     
      
     
     
     
     
       
    
   
   
      
    
 
    






While most of hypotheses proposed in this study are supported, it is worth noting
that H2c is rejected in the primary analysis. This section intends to explore this issue
further.
Table 10 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Post hoc Analysis








Family Ownership ^2 0.000095*
Firm Age 0.012** 0.012**
Organizational Slack -0.002*** -0.002***
Blockholder Ownership -0.003** -0.003***
Firm Size -0.093** -0.119**
Debt Ratio -0.384 -0.351
Firm Risk -0.001 -0.001
Advertisement Ratio -0.237 -0.521
R&D Ratio -0.221 -0.216
Plant Newness -0.149† -0.123
Inventory Ratio -0.152 -0.205
Leverage Ratio 0.013** 0.012**
International Sales 0.000 0.001
Past Performance -0.193† -0.119
Industrial Average Performance -0.129 -0.148
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.023 0.022
Cross-section 164 164
Periods 9 9
Sample Size 1,092 1,092
Within R Square 0.14 0.14
F-statistics 25.62*** 25.53***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
To begin, family ownership is conceptualized as a measure of family’s control in 
decision-making. Nevertheless, it is possible that family management –rather than family












   
 
 




                                                 
   
   
  
 
process. Indeed, compared to shareholders, managers are arguably more apt to affect 
what decisions can eventually lead to strategic actions in business. Hence, family
ownership is replaced by family management in testing for H2c (Table 10, Model 17). It 
is found that family management (Model 17, B= 0.60, p-value <0.01) has a positive and 
significant effect on strategic persistence.
In addition, it is possible that family ownership may have a curvilinear
relationship with strategic persistence. In particular, when family ownership increases 
from low to moderate levels, the family owners may be under the pressure of conformity
and have to adjust firm strategy in order to impress public shareholders as well as 
external institutes (Miller et al., 2011). At this stage, strategic change (rather than 
strategic persistence) may be favored by family shareholders. However, when family
ownership reaches a certain threshold, family owners may not need to consider other
minor shareholders’ opinions in making decisions, and the increase of family ownership 
starts to be associated with the increase of strategic persistence. Indeed, the post hoc
analysis suggests that there is a U-shape relationship between family ownership13 and 
strategic persistence (Table 10, Model 18), such that the estimated coefficient of family
ownership is negative (Table 10, Model 18, B= -0.0095, p-value <0.01), whereas the 
coefficient of the square term of family business is positive (Table 10, Model 18, B= 
0.0000095, p-value <0.05). After calculation, it is also found that the inflection of the U
shape is 50.0% ( 50.0=0.0095/(2*0.000095); also see Figure 3). This result is consistent 
13, To ensure that the curvilinear relationship is due to the family ownership’s effect rather 
than the ownership’s effect, the square term of blockholder ownership is also added into the
regression model. The estimated coefficient of blockholder ownership and the estimated 















                                                 
   
  
   
    
   
  
 
with the argument above. Indeed, although in general family firms have higher levels of 
strategic persistence compared to non-family firms, when the family ownership has not
reached a majority ownership position, the relationship between the level of family
ownership and strategic persistence is negative rather than positive14. 
Discussion
Studies have highlighted that family’s involvement in business may lead to 
distinctive strategic decisions and performance (Anderson & Reed, 2003; Villalonga, &
Amit, 2006). One neglected area is the implementation of a family firm’s strategy and 
how such implementation would lead to idiosyncratic firm performance. This essay
14, An alternative explanation is that high persistence may signal the presence of family
tradition in business, thus motivating the family to gain more ownership in business. This
argument means that strategic persistence may cause the change of family ownership rather 
than the vice versa. Nonetheless, one-year time lags have been used in the analysis to ensure
the direction of causality. It is also possible that the presence of some exogenous factor (i.e. 
firm performance) will cause the co-variance of two variables, although the endogeneity has
























intended to address these gaps. In particular, it is hypothesize that family firms tend to be 
more persistent in their implementation of strategic decisions over time, and such 
strategic persistence is likely to contribute to superior performance in family firms. It is 
also hypothesized that family firms with higher firm age, lower organizational slack and 
higher family ownership are more likely to develop persistent strategic decisions. All 
hypotheses are supported except for the effect of family ownership on strategic
persistence within the family business population. This section intends to discuss the
implications of this study. 
To begin, strategic persistence is important yet neglected in the family business 
literature. Indeed, the family business literature has long recognized that some family 
firms are oriented toward the long run, and such long-term orientation may contribute to 
superior performance (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Nevertheless, few have
developed theories regarding what types of family firms are more likely to express such 
an orientation, and how such an orientation would contribute to firm performance. More
importantly, the attention is often drawn to short-term strategic behavior (e.g. Gentry et 
al., forthcoming) rather than to the long-term window for multiple strategic dimensions. 
Such neglect may result in inaccurate theoretical propositions as well as biased empirical 
results. This study intends to fill these gaps and shed light on the long-term orientation
literature in the family business field. The empirical results suggest that in general family
firms are more persistent compared to non-family firms, and this strategic persistence 
may help improve their performance. 
In addition, drawing upon the behavioral theory of the firm, this study develops a 











   
  
   




   
   
    
 
Such a framework highlights that any strategic action in family business is the
consequences of unique goals, resources, and governance stemming from the intertwining
of family and business systems (Chua et al., 2012). Yet, the literature often highlights one
but overlooks others, which leads to inconsistent or incomplete empirical findings 
regarding family firm’s behavior and performance. Thus, the theoretical framework here
is more comprehensive compared to prevailing theories such as the SEW perspective.  
Furthermore, this study hypothesizes that firm age, organizational slack and
family ownership would contribute to the variations of family-centered goal and 
governance respectively. This hypothesis highlights that family firms are indeed 
heterogeneous, and some family firms are more persistent compared to others. Note that 
the direct effect of family ownership (H3c) is not supported in the primary analysis. 
However, it is found in the post hoc analysis that such a result is primarily due to non-
linearity in the influence of family ownership. While the basic hypotheses in this study
are still robust, further researchers are encouraged to keep exploring this direction. 
Lastly, this study conceptualizes that family endowments of resources are
characterized by inseparability, specificity and intangibility, and such characteristics
manifest mainly through the family’s involvement in management. Here a contingency
perspective is used, assuming that a high fit between strategic actions and resource
configuration would lead to better performance. Hence, strategic action that require less 
adding, leveraging and shedding of resources are more suitable for family business, and 
are more likely to bring them competitive advantage. Note that such a contingency
perspective has not been fully embraced by the family business literature (for a notable





















how certain strategic actions are more likely to bring in competitive advantages compared 
to others. 
Theoretical Implication
This essay may have potential to contribute to theories in the family business
literature in several ways. Firstly, one notable view in the family business literature is that 
family firms need to learn from non-family firms in terms of favorable strategic choices 
(e.g. Stewart & Hitt, 2012). This view has its roots in the work of business historian 
Alfred Chandler (1962) who views family business as the relics of an old era. His 
followers compellingly argue that learning from non-family firms and embracing
innovation (Block, 2012), risk-taking or corporate entrepreneurship (Chirico et al., 2011)
may bring competitive advantage to family-owned and –managed type of organizations. 
The empirical result suggests that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, while strategic
persistence may bring in negative consequences by itself, its interaction with family
business is positive and significant. Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, family firms with high 
strategic persistence perform better compared to family firms with low strategic 
persistence. Combined with the high strategic persistence found in family business (H1), 
it would imply that family business may have a unique way of implementing strategic
decisions, and persisting in past strategy may help to narrow the performance difference
between family and non-family firms. 
In a similar inquiry, some scholars advocate that at least some if not all family
firms should professionalize by employing non-family managers and experts. Such an 
argument is often based upon the assumption that family labor pool is often limited by its 















   
  




   
family managers (Chua et al., 2009). This essay challenges this view. What have been 
found in this study suggest that, although in general family’s involvement in management 
may bring in negative effects upon firm performance, its alignment with persist strategic 
decisions would result in even better performance. It appears that family managers may
have certain advantages in some strategic actions. The view that non-family managers are
always superior compared to family managers seems to be too absolute. 
Such a finding is also consistent with the contingency view which proposes that 
there should be a “fit” between strategic action and implementation, and a high level of 
fit would likely lead to superior performance (Kammerlander et al., 2015). Such a view
of “fit” may also shed light on the performance heterogeneity in family business. Indeed, 
family business scholars have recognized that performance heterogeneity in family
business may stem from unique compositions of goals, resources, and governance
structures in family business (Chrisman et al., 2013; Chua et al., 2012). What they have
not recognized and what may further advance the family business filed is that the
interaction among goal, resource and governance may be even more important. That is to 
say, further studies should further explore different combinations of goals, resources, and 
governance in terms of their interactive impacts on strategy and performance in family
business. 
One area that closely relates to the continuity of family governance in business is 
the temporality in family business. In strategy, temporality can be defined as an 
organization’s variation in strategic actions and performances across time (Langley et al., 
2013; Mosakowski & Earley, 2000). Temporality is closely related to family business 






















highlighted as a distinguishing feature of family business (Chua et al., 1999), which may
affect both strategic decision-making and performance in family business (Zellweger et 
al., 2012). In addition, generational difference in family business has been highlighted by
scholars, as founding- and late-generations often differ regarding their strategic decision-
making as well as their capabilities in appropriating rent from strategic decisions (Miller
et al., 2007). Yet, except for a dedicated special issue in Family Business Review (2013, 
27), not much attention has been paid in the area. This essay may shed light on this track, 
as it is hypothesized and found that family firms tend to be more persistent in their
strategic decisions, and such persistence may bring in positive outcomes in this type of 
organizations. 
In addition, as aforementioned, the theoretical framework in this study covers 
idiosyncratic goals, resources and governance structures in family business (Chua et al., 
2012). Note that overly emphasizing one single dimension may result in inaccurate 
predictions regarding how family firms would behave and perform. Indeed, just as Chua
and colleagues (2012, p2) have warned, “continuing to ignore family firm heterogeneity
could institutionalize a distorted homogeneous view of family firms that generates 
“panaceas,” supposedly applicable to all family firms”.
Finally, recent development in the family business literature tends to emphasize 
the non-economic and socio-emotional goals of owning families (e.g. Berrone et al., 
2012; Chrisman et al., 2012) and how such goals would affect family firm’s strategic
decisions such as risk-taking (Chrisman & Patel, 2012) and diversification (Gomez-
Mejia, 2010). Nonetheless, it is still not well known why some family firms have better 







   
   
  
     
 







   
 
  
suited exploring the heterogeneity of family firm behaviors. On the other hand, the RBV 
has been used to explore the competitive advantages in some family firms. Nevertheless, 
existing RBV studies often draw attention to different categories of family resources in 
business, assuming having resource endowments from the family system is sufficient to 
ensure superior performance. This essay focuses on the overall features of family
resources, which fundamentally affect the ways that owning families manage family-
endowed resources (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).  Indeed, it is the management of resources that 
eventually determine the consequence of any strategic action. Thus, some family firms 
are better than non-family firms not only because these family firms have valuable, rare
and non-imitable and non-substitutable resources, that also because these family firms 
have a better way of managing resources. Such a perspective also suggests that given 
high inseparability, specificity and intangibility, family firms may have advantages in 
strategic actions that require less acquisition, mobilization, and divestment of resources in 
the business systems. 
Limitation
While this study may make several contributions, it is also important to recognize
its limitations. Firstly, family ownership is used as a measure of family control in 
corporate governance. This treatment leads to the hypothesis that family ownership is
positively relate to strategic persistence in the family business population (H2c). 
However, as shown in the primary and robustness tests, this hypothesis is not supported. 
Also as revealed in the post hoc analysis, family ownership may have multiple 
implications in terms of its effects on strategic behaviors. Indeed, family ownership may





















making process, but it may not capture the actual power of the owning family in such a
process. In this matter, family management may be a better measure associated with the
family’s actual control in daily management. In addition, family ownership may be seen 
as a signal of family’s presence in business. In this manner, family firms especially those 
with low to moderate levels of family ownership may be exposed to public pressure of 
strategic conformity (Miller et al., 2011). Indeed, this theoretical issue may be one of the
limitations, and future studies should further consider the multiple facets of family
ownership in their studies. 
Also, family business is defined by family’s involvement in ownership and
management as well as the family’s vision of using the business to benefit the family and 
family members. Although several alternative measures of family business have been 
used, and some of the measures are related to the “vision” of the family, it is important to 
note that the “vision” of the family has not been directly measured, which may lead to an 
isolation between the theory and the methodology. Future studies should try to use better 
scales of family business in testing for the hypotheses in this study. 
In addition, this study uses firm age, organizational slack and family ownership as 
three measures related to family tradition, resource parsimony and family control, 
respectively. Such a conceptualization was supported by the empirical results. However, 
family tradition, resource parsimony and family control are not directly measured in the
study. One reason is the secondary data source, as it is rather difficult to gain primary
data from publicly traded companies. Indeed, this issue may lead to the isolation between 
the theory and the methodology. Indeed, this is a limitation, and future studies should use






















Furthermore, it is also important to note that these three variables mentioned 
above may only represent a small portion of variation in the family business population. 
Differently put, it is possible that there are more factors, especially those stemming from 
the family system that may further contribute to the heterogeneity in the family business 
population. 
It is also important to note that, although there are multiple hypotheses in this 
study, they are tested separately. Note that some analytic techniques such as path analysis
and structural equation modeling (SEM) may test multiple hypotheses simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, the data used in this study is longitudinal, meaning that for SEM or path 
analysis, cross-sections (682 firms) and years (9 years) must be added as control variables 
into the model (682+9), which may greatly limit the degree of freedom in the analysis
and make the analysis infeasible. Future studies should try to use other analytic 
approaches to test all hypotheses simultaneously. 
Moreover, this study uses publicly-traded firms in S&P 1500 manufacturing as 
the primary sample. Indeed, one feature of public-traded family firms is the limited range
of family ownership, as it is impossible for family ownership to reach 100% by nature. In 
addition, it is impossible to collect data for firms with less than 5% family ownership, 
because only owners with more than 5% ownership are reported in the proxy statements. 
Such a sampling would limit the generalizability of the findings in small and privately
owned family and non-family firms, as privately-owned or small- and medium-sized 
family firms often feature high family ownership as well as a higher variance of family
ownership compared to publicly-traded family firms. Future studies are encouraged to 
















    
 
 
In addition, note that this study excludes firms without at least five years 
continuous observations. Such a treatment is to ensure that the calculation of strategic
persistence is meaningful. Nevertheless, it may also affect the generalabiliy of the
sampling, as newly founded firms or firms that are reluctant to release information to the
public may be excluded from the sample. Future studies may try to use primary data 
collection in dealing with these issues. 
Finally, this study chooses to focus on the 1996-2013 range in the analysis. Such a
period is not homogenous regarding economic growth as well as market competition, 
which should provide enough variations in terms of strategic persistence as well as firm 
performance. However, even given such a long and dynamic period, the primary results 
remain significant. Future studies may further test the hypotheses in different periods. 
Conclusion
To conclude, this essay intends to explore the antecedents and consequences of 
strategic persistence in publicly-trade family business. The differences between family
and non-family firms as well as the heterogeneity among family firms themselves 
presented in this essay can help scholars, family business members, and investors better 
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ESSAY 2: FAMILY BU AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE
Introduction
One critical yet under-researched strategy that family decision-makers must
consider is diversification (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010), which involves the organization of 
multiple business units under the control of a single corporation (Markowitz, 1968; 
Rumelt, 1982; Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). Diversification can be extremely
attractive to family businesses15, because it may reduce the overall business risk that a 
family-owned-managed corporation is exposed to (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Yet the
current inquiry of diversification in the family business literature largely focuses on the
extent of diversification (Pukall & Calabrò, 2014), or the sequential pattern in which a
family business chooses to diversify (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). This leaves unexplored 
inquiries related to the actual management of diversified units. It is not known, for 
example, how family firms manage their diversified units, and how family management 
of diversified units may impact performance in family businesses. Given the importance
15. Family firms are defined by a family’s involvement in firm ownership and management and the pursuit 
of family-centered vision for how the firm will benefit the family, potentially across generations (e.g.,











    
 
  





                                                 
             
           
          
        
of diversification strategies in family businesses, this inquiry is critical and valuable to 
both family business researchers and practitioners.
Drawing upon the literatures of the behavioral theory of the firm, diversification, 
and family business, this study intends to explore the extent that a family business 
chooses to use a dominant resource- allocation strategy among its diversified units, and 
how this dominant strategy may affect family business performance. In this regard, a
dominant strategy is defined as a corporate-level strategy where similar patterns of 
resource allocation are utilized among related16 diversified units in a multi-business 
company (Lamberg et al., 2009; Turner & Rindova, 2012). 
In this study, it is hypothesized that in comparison to non-family businesses, 
family businesses are more likely to have a dominant strategy due to the presence of 
family tradition, parsimony and family control in family-owned and –managed firms. It is 
also hypothesized that firm age, organizational slack and family ownership will influence
the usage of a dominant strategy in family business. In the end, it is expected that a 
dominant strategy will lead to better performance in family businesses relative to non-
family businesses, especially for family firms with high family involvement in 
management. 
Thus, this essay intends to make several major contributions to the literature. 
First, building upon the concept of dominant strategy in diversified corporations, this 
essay develops theory on how family businesses may differ from non-family businesses,
16. This study follows Rumelt (1974) in using the portion of total revenue coming from a single business
segment based on SIC-2 code to classify related and unrelated business units. To address the fact that 
resource are allocated among multiple areas in a business unit, three strategic dimensions are chosen for













   
 
   
 
   






and from one another in the manner in which they manage related diversification. Indeed, 
family firms tend to formulate idiosyncratic strategies (e.g. Chrisman & Patel, 2012; 
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). However, the literature has never explored how a family
business realizes its strategy in terms of resource allocations in diversification (c.f. Hofer 
& Schendel, 1978). This essay attempts to fill this gap by exploring whether and how 
family businesses---in comparison to non-family businesses and one another---are more
likely to use a dominant strategy across diversified units. Second, there is an increasing
recognition that family businesses are heterogeneous in terms of firm behaviors and 
performance (Chua et al., 2012). In this essay it is argued that related business units in a
family-owned corporation are rather homogenous in terms of allocations of key
resources. Hence within the boundary of a family firm, firm behaviors tend to converge
rather than diverge across business units. Third, this essay contributes to the
diversification literature (e.g. Harrison et al., 1993; Lamberg et al., 2009), as it proposes 
that at least some family businesses may have unique ways to manage their diversified 
units and may benefit from doing that. Finally, this essay contributes to an improved 
understanding of family firm performance (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller et al., 
2007), as the model suggests that the pursuit of a dominant strategy can be one
mechanism by which family governance contributes to firm performance.
This essay starts with an overview of the diversification literature followed by a 
review of diversification in family business. Then it builds hypotheses related to family
business and dominant strategy. This essay also explore firm age, organizational slack 
and family ownership as three antecedents related to dominant strategy in family























firm performance in family business. Then, the methodology, analytic results and 
implications are discussed. This essay ends with discussions of theoretical implications, 
limitations and conclusion. 
Dominant Strategy in Related Diversification
Related diversification may bring in competitive advantages to organizations.  
The relatedness of diversification refers to the existence of similarities among products, 
markets and/or technologies across diversified business units (Miller, 2006; Pehrsson, 
2006; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987). Relatedness 
in diversification can create synergies when a firm shares production factors across 
related business units (Goold & Luchs, 1993; Markides & Williamson, 1994; Rumelt, 
1974, 1982; Teece, 1980). Indeed, when managed properly, relatedness should result in 
superior performance such that the whole multi-business corporation is more profitable 
than the sum of the individual business units (Kanter, 1989; Porter, 1985). 
Although there are numerous studies supporting the superiority of related 
diversification (Hitt et al., 2006; Rumelt, 1982; Mille, 2006), a substantial body of 
empirical research have found no significant relationship between diversification strategy
and performance (Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Grant et al., 1988). In order to 
explore this “paradox”, some theorists argue that the organization of related business 
units is at least as important as diversifying into related businesses (Hill & Hoskisson, 
1987; Kazanjian & Drazin, 1987; Shayne Gary, 2005). Indeed, although synergy can 
result from relatedness, achieving synergy depends upon proper management (Grant, 





    
  
   













One appealing argument in this inquiry is that there should be a dominant strategy
in all related business units so that synergy can be created (Grant, 1988; Hoskisson & 
Hitt, 1990; Prehalad & Bettis, 1986). As Mahoney and Pandian contend, "a rich 
connection among the firm's resources, distinctive competencies and mental models or 
‘dominant logic’…of the managerial team drives the diversification process" (1992, 
p.365). Indeed, resource allocations across units need to be coherent to ensure the 
creation and sustainability of competitive advantage (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Nath &
Sudharstnan, 1994; Sirmon et al., 2007, 2010). Given the assumption that strategy
concerns the acquisition, mobilization, utilization and divestment of resources (Hofer &
Schendel, 1978; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Sirmon et al., 2007, 2011; Wernerfelt, 
1984), a dominant strategy can be defined as a corporation-level strategy that involves 
similar patterns of resource allocations among related business units in a diversified 
multi-business company (Lamberg et al., 2009; Palich et al., 2000; Turner & Rindova, 
2012).  
To sum up, the diversification literature often assumes diversifying into related 
businesses is sufficient to create competitive advantage, while a dominant strategy
perspective recognizes that related units need to be properly organized in order to create 
superior performance at the corporation level (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Govindarajan, 
1988; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Hoskisson et al., 1991). In this regard, a dominant 
strategy can be conceptualized as a special form of relatedness occurring in the manner 























Family Business and Diversification
Due to the particular focus in this essay, it is critical to review the diversification 
literature in family businesses. The literature remains controversial in terms of whether
family business diversifies more or less (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010), but there appears to be
a consensus that there are two primary drivers that distinguish diversification decisions 
between family and non-family firms: family-centered goals and family-endowed 
resources. 
Family-centered goals refer to those coming from family owner-managers or
other influential family members that affect strategic decision-making in a family firm 
(Berrone et al., 2012; Carney, 2005; Chrisman et al., 2012; Chua et al., 2012). Those
goals include not only family-centered non-economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2012;
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), but also the family’s economic concerns regarding the 
creation and accumulation of family wealth (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman et al., 
2003). Family-centered non-economic goals include the preservation of the family’s
authority and influence in business, the emotional value of owning a firm, family
members’ identification with the firm, the closeness and cohesion among family
members, and renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession (Berrone
et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2012; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). There are several 
mechanisms by which family-centered goals may impact the extent of diversification in 
family business. 
Firstly, the separation of ownership and control leads to information asymmetries 
and contractual problems, giving rise to the potential for agency conflicts between 





















from other firms as owners and managers are more likely to belong to the same family or 
families (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, 1994). Thus, diversification is less likely to be 
embraced by family-owned and -managed firms because controlling families are often 
risk-averse (Gallo et al., 2004) and refuse to engage in risky strategies such as 
diversification (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Chrisman & Patel, 2012). Diversification may
also require the introduction of external investment and/or the employment of non-family
experts, both of which may dilute family control (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). 
Nevertheless, family owner-managers tend to have fast decision-making processes and
often possess shared vision in strategic decisions (Carney, 2005). That would suggest that 
when family owner-managers decide to diversify, the decision-making process in the
business system can be faster and the implementation of diversification decisions more
efficient than those in a non-family business setting (Tsang, 2002).  
Furthermore, scholars recognize that family businesses are unique, as the family’s
involvement endows the business with family-based resources. In this sense, the 
interaction of family units, the business entity and individual members (Gersick, et al., 
1997), can lead to competitive advantages in family firms (Pearson et al., 2008). For 
instance, Habbershon and Williams (1999) and Habbershon et al. (2003) argue that a 
family’s involvement in business may bring in distinctive resources unavailable to non-
family firms, such as those based on human, social, patient, survivability, and governance
capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Following the logic of the resource-based view of the firm 
(e.g. Barney, 1991), if resource attributes in an organization affect the process of strategic
decision-making (Wernerfelt, 1984), then the family-endowed resources should affect the









   
  




    
 
  
   
 
  
Indeed, it has been argued that family firms possess certain relation-based capital 
either among family members or with its stakeholders such as trust, altruism and social 
connections (Pearson et al., 2008; Zahra, 2003). This source of capital can positively
influence relationships within the family as well as relationships with non-family
stakeholders, including non-family managers, customers, business partners, governmental 
institutions, etc. (Zellweger & Nason, 2008). This source of capital may contribute to 
diversification as it increases the coordination among business units in family business as 
well as the collaboration between a family business and its stakeholders (Zahra, 2003). 
On the other hand, family-endowed human resources are characterized by high levels of 
specificity meaning family managers often possess deep knowledge, but only in certain 
strategic areas (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Hence, the specificity of family human resource
may limit the scope of diversification in family business (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010).   
Although not documented directly, the literature implies that family firms may
follow a generic approach in designing diversification strategies (Graves & Thomas, 
2006, 2008). For instance, family businesses tend to diversify sequentially and are more
likely to diversify in international markets that are geographically or culturally close to 
their headquarters (Claver et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). This would suggest 
that family firms differ from non-family ones not only in the extent to which they
diversify but also in the way that they try to manage their diversified units.
Unfortunately, firm diversification is still an understudied research area in the
family business literature (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010; Pukall & Calabrò, 2014). In 
particular, most studies have focused on the extent of diversification rather than the 




   





   
 
  










   
concerning family businesses and diversification may be due to the fact that family firms 
manage diversification differently from non-family firms. The topic of this essay may
have the potential to fill these gaps. 
Hypothesis Development: Family Business and Dominant Strategy in Related
Diversification
Theoretical Framework
There appears to be few if any studies in the family business literature that 
explicitly explore the management of diversified units or a dominant strategy in related 
diversification. In addition, existing studies of diversification in family business remains 
controversial in terms of whether family businesses diversify more or less, as well as the 
performance consequences of diversification in family firms (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010). 
Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the management of diversification is still an 
understudied research area in the family business literature (Pukall & Calabrò, 2014).
Due to the uniqueness of family businesses, it is rather naive to directly borrow 
theories from non-family business settings (Berrone et al., 2012; Chua et al., 1999; 
Gedajlovic et al., 2012). In addition, the literature suggests that family firms have
heterogeneous goals, resources and governance structures (Carney, 2005; Chrisman et al., 
2005; Chua et al., 2012). Indeed, strategic decisions in family businesses are often 
initiated by family-centered goals (Chrisman et al., 2012), supported by family-endowed 
resources (Habbershon & Williams, 1999) and implemented by the family’s dominant 
position in corporation governance (Carney, 2005). Accordingly, this paper follows a
behavioral perspective (Cybert & March, 1963). Such a perspective assumes that a 










   
 







   
     
   
 
 
                                                 
         
    
centered non-economic goals that create or preserve its socio-emotional wealth17 
(Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, 2011).
Furthermore, this perspective assumes that family governance is a necessary condition for
the controlling family to realize its strategy in the organization (Carney, 2005). In other
words, without strong family control, the presence of family-centered goals and/or 
family-endowed resources may not significantly influence strategic actions in family
business simply because the family does not have the ability to do so (De Massis et al., 
2014). In the end, the performance consequence of a specific strategic action is also 
influenced by the organization of resources such that a structure that may facilitate
coordination of multiple tasks should lead to superior performance (Hofer & Schendel, 
1978; Jones & Hill, 1988). This point is especially critical to diversification as the 
creation of synergy in diversification often results from coordination of resources in 
diversified yet related business units (Agarwal et al., 2012; Rawley, 2010; Zhou, 2011). 
According to this perspective, the owning-family’s management of
diversification, such as using a dominant strategy in related diversification, is driven by
its willingness to maintain family tradition and its intention to invest parsimoniously, 
being supported by family’s control over the business. In addition, it is expected that
family management also serve as a unique type of governance of resource management
that may facilitate the coordination of related business units in diversification, hence
dominant strategy should lead to better performance given high family involvement in 
daily management. 
17. Socio-emotional wealth refers to non-financial aspects or “affective endowments” of members in the 























   
The following section hypothesizes that relative to non-family businesses, family
businesses are more likely to have a dominant strategy in related diversification than non-
family businesses. 
Family Business and Dominant Strategy
To begin, family-owned-managed businesses are characterized by family tradition 
in the business system (Berrone et al., 2012). Family tradition is chosen because it lies at 
the center of the family’s socio-emotional or non-economic concerns (Berrone et al., 
2005), and also because it is directly related to the continuity of family’s control over 
generations (Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). 
Indeed, family tradition consists of preservation, constancy, and durability
(Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011), and concerns the preservation of long-standing aspirations 
and legacy in the family system (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Gersick et al., 1997), 
ensures the constancy of family image and reputation in the eye of non-family
stakeholders and local community (Berrone et al., 2010; Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013), 
and directly relates to the family’s intention to maintain control of the business, 
especially across multiple generations (Miller et al., 2003; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004). 
Also, maintaining a strong family tradition may facilitate the rise of an individual family
member’s identification of “belongingness” to the family (Zellweger et al., 2010), 
strengthen a family member’s emotional attachment with the business (Miller & Le
Breton-Miller, 2005), and enhance the legitimacy that the business system adopts for the 
benefits of the individual family member (Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). Combined, it






   
  
















members (Sharma, 2004), and is strongly related to the owning family’s non-economic
goals and socio-emotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2012). 
So, the presence of family tradition in business should strengthen a dominant
strategy in related diversification. Firstly, family tradition may give rise to rigid mindsets
of family decision-makers (König et al., 2013). The intention to maintain family tradition 
is based on the belief that that which is long-lasting has value to both the family and the 
business (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). Hence mental rigidity may make family decision-
makers less open to new and alternative options (Chandler, 1962) and have whatever has 
been used in the past, unless the family’s non-economic or socio-emotional goals have
been threaten (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, 2013). Indeed, family
decision-makers often continue existing mindsets in terms of the heuristic principals used 
in interpreting information as well as sorting possible alternative solutions (Gedajlovic et 
al., 2004). For the concern of diversification, family decision-makers often choose to 
diversify into areas that are similar to existing businesses (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). 
Using the same rationale, it is reasonable to assume that family decision-makers will 
continue the management approaches and practices used in existing businesses, leading to 
the rise of a dominant strategy in related diversification. 
In addition, an owning-family may have incentives to build family image and 
reputation (Berrone et al., 2010; Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013), especially for the local 
community and other external stakeholders who are important to the economic and non-
economic success of the owning-family (Sharma & Manikuti, 2005; Zahra, 2010). On the 
other hand, the strength of family image and reputation in a multi-business family














    
  
 
   
 
 
individual business units (Carter, 2006; Highhouse et al., 2009). Put differently, to build a 
prominent family image and reputation, the owning family could intentionally manipulate
strategic actions in multiple business units, such as diversifying into related businesses 
and choosing to use exiting patterns of resource allocation in managing newly acquired 
businesses. Thus, due to the presence of family tradition, family businesses are more
likely to build dominant strategy in related diversification in comparison to non-family
businesses. 
Another reason behind the pursuit of a dominant strategy in family business is the
family’s tendency of being parsimonious in resource utilization. Unless it is unavoidable, 
owning families are often parsimonious in utilizing resources, because a large amount of 
resources in the business comes from the family system, and the family attempts to 
optimize the utilization of their resources (Carney, 2005). This would suggest that the 
owning family may be motivated to reduce unnecessary expenses and/or favor strategies
that requires less additional investment. Diversifying into new areas and/or using new 
ways to manage diversified units often require extensive resource investments in research 
and development, production capacity, advertisement and administration (Chatterjee & 
Wernerfelt, 1991). Furthermore, building dominant strategy across related business units 
may be beneficial for family owner-managers, as they don't need to design idiosyncratic
practices and routines for each unit (Lampel & Shamsie, 2000), and administrative
experience in existing business units can be easily transferred into new ones (Agarwal et 
al., 2012; Breschi et al., 2003; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005). 
In addition, to the arguments above, the pursuit of dominant strategy in family




   
 






   
 
 




    
   
 
is a necessary condition to transfer the family’s concerns of family tradition and resource
parsimony into actual firm behaviors (Cyert & March, 1963). Family control may help 
facilitate the rise of a dominant strategy in related diversification for two primary reasons. 
First, family owner-managers have power, discretion, and legitimacy in the
dominant coalition in a family business, making their personalized goals more likely to 
be transmitted into the business system (Carney, 2005). This suggests that decision-
makers in diversified units are more likely to behave in accordance with the owning
family’s goals and concerns such as maintaining family tradition and being parsimonious
in resource investment, making dominant strategy more likely to arise. 
Second, a definitive feature of a family business is the family’s tendency to 
maintain its control. In this sense, family firms may intentionally avoid hiring non-family
professional executives (McConaughy, 2000) or borrowing monetary resources from 
external sources (Anderson et al., 2003; Chua et al., 2011) as these practices would dilute
family’s direct control over firm operation (McConaughy et al., 1998). On the other hand, 
diversifying into new areas or using new ways to manage diversified units often depends
upon skills and knowledge from professional executives as well as extra financial 
resources coming from external institutes (Kochhar & Hitt, 1998; Kor & Leblebici, 
2005). One potential solution is to diversify into similar areas, which by definition should 
increase the relatedness of diversification in family businesses (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2010). At the same time, family firms may choose to replicate what hsd been used before
in newly acquired businesses especially in related ones, leading to the rise of dominant 




   
   
   
 
 
   













   
Taken all the aforementioned together, because of the unique combination of 
family tradition, parsimony and family control, family firms are more likely to use 
similar resource allocations across their related business units than non-family firms. 
Hypothesis 1: Family businesses are more likely to have a dominant strategy across 
related multiple business units than non-family businesses. 
Hypothesis Development: Heterogeneity of Family Business and Dominant Strategy
Family businesses are heterogeneous due to idiosyncratic goals, resources, and 
governance structures aligned with the family’s involvement in business (Chua et al., 
2012). One remaining question is what causes the variance of the use of dominant 
strategy in the family business population. Framed differently, what are the conditions 
that make some family firms more likely to embrace such a strategic choice compared to 
other family firms? Indeed, it is possible that some family firms perceive family tradition 
as being more important, are more parsimonious in resource investment, and have more
power in decision-making compared to others. Consistent with the theoretical framework 
mentioned above, firm age, organizational slack, and family ownership should be
relevant to the use of a dominant strategy in family business. 
Firm Age
Firm age is an important research focus in the strategic management literature
(Durand & Coeurderoy, 2001; Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Indeed, scholars have long
claimed that organizations tend to become rigid and slow to change when they grow older
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984). As firms age, the behaviors of decision-makers become 
increasingly guided by institutionalized norms and habits (Deephouse, 1996). In 








   
   
 








   
 
  
   
operating experiences (Nelson & Winter, 1982), and pre-existing rules are increasingly
used to understand their environment (Daft & Weick, 1984). Hence rigidity should be
higher in older than younger firms (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). The same rationale can be
applied to family firms, as relative to younger family firms, older ones would become 
more rigid in using family-centered practices and routines which are guided by family
tradition. Indeed, while non-family firms only become inflexible in the business system, 
family firms become inflexible in both the family and the business systems (Gersick et 
al., 1997). In this regard, the preservation and continuity of family tradition in the family
system would further facilitate the adoption of family tradition in the business system 
(Arregle et al., 2007). Hence, the use of a dominant strategy is expected to be greater in 
older compared to younger family firms, as older ones are more rigid in using family-
centers traditions in strategic decision-making such as diversification. 
Furthermore, more family members tend to be involved in firm management 
when family firms get older (Gersick et al., 1997). The inclusion of new family members 
would make family tradition more salient, as these family members are born, educated 
and groomed within family tradition. Thus, older family firms are more likely to embrace
dominant strategy because more family members are included in the business, while
these members are natural agents of family traditions. Although arguably there may be
some especially late-generation junior family members who are unwilling to follow what 
other family members are doing, strong social connections among family members make
these divergent behaviors more likely to be found, while strong family-centered norms 
may pose high social pressure upon those family members to conform (Pollak, 1985). Put













   
  
    
 




    
 
tradition over time. As a comparison, non-family business may also have new members 
joining in over time, but these members often have diverse backgrounds and experiences 
hence their participations may weaken rather than strengthen the tradition in the 
organization (Schneider et al., 1995). 
In sum, it appears that the effect of family tradition should be stronger in older
family firms. Thus:
Hypothesis 2a: Firm age is positively related to the use of a dominant strategy in the
diversification of family firms. 
Organizational Slack 
Organizational slack refers to organizational resources that are embedded in the 
firm as costs which are greater than those needed by the firm (Singh, 1986). Examples of 
organizational slack include excessive stocks of cash and securities (Greve, 2003). In this 
matter, firms may employ more individuals than necessary to operate effectively year 
round to provide a cushion or buffer from disruptions in output (Cyert & March, 1963).
As mentioned above, one distinguishing feature of family business is resource
parsimony (Carney, 2005). Nonetheless, not all family firms are alike, and some may be
more parsimonious than others. Given the fact that parsimony concerns the efficiency of 
resource utilization, a high level of organizational slack in family business would signal a 
lower level of resource parsimony in the owning family (Mishina et al., 2004; Voss et al., 
2008). 
Following this rationale, organizational slack should negatively relate to the use
of a dominant strategy in family business. Indeed, increasing investment in organizational





















   
family firms tend to avoid specific non-deployable investments, some may choose to do 
so anyway due to threats to family-centered socio-emotional wealth (Chrisman & Patel, 
2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, 2013). Given the fact that resource parsimony is an 
important factor driving the use of a dominant strategy, the increase of organizational 
slack would be negatively associated with the use of a dominant strategy in related 
diversification, meaning family firms with higher organizational slack would be less 
likely to use a dominant strategy. Hence:
Hypothesis 2b: Organizational slack is negatively related to the use of a dominant 
strategy in the diversification of family firms. 
Family Ownership 
Family firms vary by the extent of families’ involvement in ownership (Arregle et 
al., 2012). Indeed, the extent of controlling family ownership may significantly impact 
the decision-making process, as it directly relates to the extent that the dominant coalition
considers the family’s interests in making decisions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2013; Mitchell 
et al., 1997). This suggests that idiosyncratic firm decisions resulting from family’s 
involvement in business is more salient given high family ownership compared to those
with low family ownership. 
Indeed, the increase of family ownership in family business could provide power 
and legitimacy to family owner-managers (Carney, 2005). In addition, the increase of 
family ownership should strengthen the salience of family interests and concerns in 
family business decisions such as the use of a dominant strategy in related diversification 
(Chrisman et al., 2012). On the other hand, non-family owners may have concerns that 




   
 
   
    
 
 










   
 
(Gedajlovic et al., 2004). In this regard, non-family owners put more attention on growth 
in their investments, which is more aligned with a higher level of diversification and 
probably a more idiosyncratic way of managing each business unit. Although these non-
family owners are not as powerful as family owner-managers, the presence of non-family
blockholder or institutional investors may still be a hindrance, mitigating family influence
on strategic decisions such as diversification (Arregle et al., 2012). 
Combined, it is expected that relative to family firms with lower family
ownership, those with higher family ownership should have more power as a result of 
less hindrance coming from non-family owners. 
Hypothesis 2c: Family ownership is positively related to the use of a dominant 
strategy in the diversification of family firms. 
Hypothesis Development: Dominant Strategy and Firm Performance
Regarding the consequence of pursuing a dominant strategy in family business, it 
is still not well known how a dominant strategy in related diversification affects family
firm performance. As will be further discussed below, based upon the coordination and 
the resource management literature, it is argued that governance structure in family-
owned and -managed business features better internal mobilization of resources thus
lower coordination cost in diversification, hence facilitate the creation of synergy through 
a dominant strategy. This section intends to review relevant literature and develop 
hypotheses that link dominant strategy to firm performance in family business. 
Resource Management and Coordination Cost
According to Teece (1980, p.224), “diversification can represent a mechanism for








   
 








common to a number of production processes geared to distinct final product markets.” In 
this sense, synergy is created when a firm shares input factors across multiple lines of 
business (Rumelt, 1982). Accordingly, it is generally believed that related diversification 
is preferable to unrelated or less related diversification because more inputs/resources can 
be shared and better synergy of resource utilization can be created in related 
diversification (Markides & Williamson, 1994; Miller, 2006). 
The center of synergy creation lies in the sharing and free mobilization of key
resources across business units (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1980). So using a dominant 
strategy in related diversification can improve firm performance for a number of reasons. 
First, a dominant strategy across units itself is a critical organizational resource. Indeed, 
diversification often demands highly-specialized administrative resources or skills (Aiken 
& Hage, 1968), which are often not divisible and difficult to share across units (Penrose, 
1959). Hence a dominant strategy in related diversification can improve corporate-level 
performance, because individual business units in this instance do not need to build 
idiosyncratic individual-based administrative strategy for each unit (Lampel & Shamsie, 
2000). Second, a dominant strategy in related diversification can be perceived as a pattern 
of thinking in organizing resources, which may reduce physical and mental boundaries of 
resource transfer across business units. Resources here include tangible resources such as 
technology, employees, facilities, etc. as well as intangible resources such as 
organizational knowledge, culture, identity, etc. (Barney, 1986; Fiol, 2001; Grant, 1996; 
Harrison et al., 1991). Indeed, the successful transfer of intangible resources across 
business units has been highlighted as a key factor contributing to the effectiveness of 


















    
  
Venkatraman, 2005). Thus, a shared dominant strategy in related diversification may
signal similar routines and practices under which resources are managed. In this regard, 
resources can be easily shed, leveraged and re-bundled as business units all share the 
same routines and practices in organizing these resources. 
Nevertheless, having a dominant strategy in related diversification does not
necessarily ensure superior performance as there may be coordination problems 
remaining. Here, coordination problems refer to barriers that may hinder resource
mobilizations and leveraging across business units. Indeed, under a dominant strategy, 
although diversified business units may use similar patterns of resource distribution, 
managers may still have varying cognitions regarding what they are supposed to do. In 
addition, managers may have insufficient communication with each other and not fully
understand the dynamics across multiple units. Lastly, managers may have conflicts 
which hinder resource sharing and mobilization across units. Hence, superior
performance can be better achieved in dominant strategy when the company applies an 
appropriate governance structure to manage coordination (Datta, 1991; Larsson &
Finkelstein, 1999; Pablo, 1994). 
Sharing common inputs creates interdependencies between business lines (Gupta
& Govindarajan, 1984). It requires joint designing, joint scheduling, and mutual 
adjustments, as well as setting transfer prices and designing incentive schemes 
(Williamson, 1981). Consequently, interdependencies in diversification challenge three
fundamental elements of coordination: problem framing, communication and conflict
resolution in the top management team (TMT) (Marschak & Radner, 1972). Problem 





















alternative solutions in the mindsets of top managers (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Yeo, 
1995). Accordingly, coherent problem framing in a top management team could reduce
coordination problems resulting from cognitive divergences in the side of top managers 
(Amason & Sapienza, 1997). Communication means the exchange of personal options as 
well as the sharing of information in order to reducing information asymmetry within 
TMT (Priem, 1990). Conflict resolution refers to formal and informal approaches
occupied by the focal organization to mitigate or diminish inter-personal conflicts in the 
TMT (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989; Simons & Peterson, 2000). These three elements refer to 
coordination problems stemming from cognitive divergence, miscommunication, and
conflict among top managers (Mitchell et al., 2011). In other words, coordination costs in 
related diversification may increase if top managers do not have coherent problem 
framing, do not have sufficient communication, and/or have conflicts with each other.  
Such a perspective assumes that managers in the TMT are largely in charge of 
coordinating activities in diversified business units, especially related ones. This 
assumption is built upon the fact that diversified units, although directly managed by
middle-level executives in each unit, often follow orders and instructions from top 
managers (Michel & Hambrick, 1992). Hence coordination among diversified units is
directly determined by coordination among the TMT (Kogut & Zander, 1996. Martinez &
Jarillo, 1989). One notable feature of family business is the family’s involvement in the 
top management team, which not only transmits the owning family’s goals and concerns 
into firm’s decision-making (Chrisman et al., 2012), but also provides power and 
legitimacy to ensure these startegic decisions are being implemented (Carney, 2005). 







    
 










   
 
framing, communication and conflict resolution, and hence have lower coordination cost 
and superior performance when using a dominant strategy in related diversification. 
Problem Framing
Coordination costs in diversified business units initially stem from the divergence
of the cognitions of top managers in framing a strategic problem. Arguably all strategic
decisions stem from cognitions framed on top managers’ mindsets (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991). It is a manager’s cognition that allows comprehension of the complexity of threats 
and opportunities in the environment (Rainbow & Sullivan, 1987; Thomas & McDaniel, 
1990), as well as the formulation of solutions that take advantage of business 
opportunities and/or to cope with environmental threats (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). 
Indeed, cognition allows managers to “categorize an event, assess its consequences, and 
consider appropriate actions (including doing nothing), and to do so rapidly and often 
efficiently” (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986, p.489). Nevertheless, top managers often hold 
distinctive, and in under some circumstances even conflicting, beliefs about internal and 
external contexts (Health et al., 1998), and problems of coordination may result from that 
(Wilson & Brekke, 1994). It is found that TMTs with high diversity (e.g. Horwitz & 
Horwitz, 2007) of past experience (Mitchell et al., 2011), demographics (Klenke, 2003)
and education (Simons et al., 1999) may have high cognitive divergence in framing
problems. This in turn may result in high costs in coordinating firm activities even in 
related diversification, as top managers may hold idiosyncratic beliefs about what they
are supposed to do (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989; Rawley, 2010). 
On the other hand, family managers, compared to non-family managers, are more



















often have shared vision and language due to their long embeddedness in the family
system (Adler & Kwon, 2002), hence they are more likely to have similar systems of 
meaning, interpretations and representations in handling day-to-day business (Pearson et 
al., 2008). In comparison, managers in non-family settings, due to their distinctive 
personal beliefs, educational backgrounds and working experiences, are more likely to 
have different cognitions for framing problems. Secondly, family managers often use the 
collective interest of the whole family as their primary reference point in framing
problems (Pollak, 1985). In this regard, family managers often have converging
cognitions regarding what best aligns with the interest of the family, and engage in 
behaviors that protect or fulfill family-centered interests, such as formulating and 
implementing a dominant strategy in related diversification to preserve family image and 
family reputation (Berrone et al., 2010). On the other hand, non-family managers are
motivated to a great extent by their personal interests, which are by nature divergent from 
each other (Jensen & Meckling, 1994). 
Combined, both points appear to suggest that, relative to non-family managers, 
family managers will have a higher level of similarity of cognition in framing problems. 
This is to suggest that family firm’s advantages in coherent problem framing may
improve the performance of a dominant strategy. Indeed, having a dominant strategy does 
not automatically ensure managers understand what to do to implement such a strategy. 
Coherent problem framing in family business would reduce the coordination costs
associated with divergent understandings among family managers, which potentially



















Communication refers to the exchange of personal opinions and business 
information among managers. One advantage of using a dominant strategy in related 
diversification is that similarity of strategic activities across units may facilitate resource
sharing and mobilizing among related units (Sirmon et al., 2007). In addition, 
communication may facilitate knowledge transfer, which allows knowledge gained in one 
business unit to be applied to problems being experienced in another unit (Agarwal et al., 
2012). On the other hand, miscommunication may lead to problems in coordination, as 
managers often receive inconsistent, even conflicting, information regarding what others 
are doing and what they are supposed to react (Bergh, 1998).
Relative to non-family managers, family managers may have fewer 
communication problems for two reasons. First, family managers often have formal and 
informal channels of information flow, which are not likely to be shared by all managers 
in a non-family business setting (Pearson et al., 2008). This would suggest that besides 
communication channels in business, family managers may have additional and often 
informal ways to share opinions and exchange information in the family system 
(Hoffman et al., 2006). While arguably some non-family managers may also have
informal communications, it is not likely that all of them share the same informal 
network of communication. Second, there is a large network overlap among family
managers compared to non-family managers, meaning that even without intra-family
communication, family managers are still more likely to get homogenous information 




   
  
 















   
Similar to coherent problem framing, frequent communication is expected to help 
the implementation of a dominant strategy in family business. Indeed, by communicating
with each other, family managers may gather more information about what diversified 
units are doing, which may help to understand how resources should be mobilized and 
shared across units. This would in turn assure the creation of synergy among related units 
given a dominant strategy. 
Conflict Resolution
It is certainly possible that top managers may have conflicts with each other 
(Simons & Peterson, 2000). Compared to non-family managers, family managers are
expected to have more and better methods to resolve inter-personal conflicts for several 
reasons. 
First, by nature, non-family managers are often driven by their personal interests
while family managers are more likely to be influenced by the collective interest of the 
whole family (Carney, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976, 1994). Indeed, individual family
members often perceive themselves as part of the owning family (Zellweger et al., 2010), 
feeling that the family business’ success is their own success (Berrone et al., 2012). 
Hence ceteris paribus interest divergence is higher among non-family managers 
compared to family managers, which may in turn result in more inter-personal conflicts 
among non-family managers. In addition, as mentioned above, family managers have
informal as well as formal communication channels, which are absent among non-family
managers (Pearson et al., 2008). This would suggest that frequent communications 
among family members may partially resolve conflicts stemming from information 



















family system, making family managers being motivated and/or obligated to behave
according to the best interest of the whole family (Chrisman et al., 2012; Eddleston & 
Kellermanns, 2007; Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004; Pearson et al., 2008). Although 
arguably there may be some family members who are unwilling to understand or follow 
what other family members are doing, strong social connections among family members 
make these divergent behaviors more likely to be found, while strong family-centered 
norms may pose high social pressure upon those family members to conform (Pollak, 
1985). Differently put, strong family norms have the potential to resolve intra-family
conflicts over time. 
Family firm’s advantage in conflict resolution may help the implementation of a
dominant strategy for two reasons. First, given the fact that top managers are often in 
charge of different units, conflict among top managers may give rise to antagonism
among related business units, which in turn weakens resource sharing/mobilization across 
units and eventually hinder the synergy creation stemming from a dominant strategy
(Hansen et al., 2005). Second, better methods of conflict resolution in family business 
may further contribute to coherent problem framing and effective communication, both of 
which are expected to support the implementation of a dominant strategy as mentioned 
above (Ensley et al., 2002).  
In sum, insights from problem framing, communication and conflict resolution all 
taken, it is expected that family involvement in a business should strengthen the positive









   











   
Family Management
To this point, this essay proposes that in comparison to non-family business, the 
family business is a better form of governance to appropriate rent from a dominant 
strategy in related diversification. To justify this point, this essay suggests that family
business can mitigate problems of problem framing, communication and conflict
resolution in coordinating related business units in diversification, which is built upon the
assumption that interactions among family managers may lead to less coordination 
problems. Nevertheless, not all family firms have a large number of family members 
involved in management. Indeed, the growth of the business may surpass the growth of 
the family hence the family may not have sufficient members to fill top managerial 
positions (Illias, 2006). In addition, some family members may prefer to stay in 
ownership instead of managerial positions (Gersick et al., 1997). In this instance family
businesses may vary by family’s involvement in management. Following the rationale 
above, it is expected that the higher family involvement in management the fewer the
coordination problems that should occur in using dominant strategy in related 
diversification. That would suggest that compared to family businesses with low family
involvement in management, those with high involvement should have better 
performance stemming from the use of a dominant strategy in related diversification. 
Hence it is expected:
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive interaction between family management and 






















The sample is composed of manufacturing firms listed in the S&P 1500 index
from 1996 to 2013 with at least five years of continuous information available. Utility
and service firms are excluded owing to differences in government regulations and 
feasible diversification options of these firms compared to manufacturing firms. Such 
exclusion ensures greater homogeneity in the sample. The data is longitudinal in nature. 
The 1996 to 2013 period is used because it covers the “Internet Bubble” and financial 
crisis periods in which firms’ diversification are likely to vary. Hence dominant strategy
and firm performance should have sufficient variation in the sample. In addition, this 
range covers periods used in previous studies on family businesses (Anderson & Reeb 
2003; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester & Cannella, 2007) as well as observations in 
recent years. Firms without at least five years of continuous information are also 
excluded, because the measure of dominant strategy by nature requires sustained 
operation of the business units over an extended period of time. 
To identify founding families, and the role of those families in a firm (as part of
the top management team and/or board of directors), information in Hoover’s, 
ExecuComp, Fundinguniverse.com, ancestry.com, firm websites, and company proxy
statements are collected. Measures related to corporate governance and family business 
such as family ownership and family management are obtained from annual firm proxy
reports. Other variables including dominant strategy primarily come from the Historical 
Segment in the Compustat database. To ensure the direction of causality, one-year lags 



















   
 
dependent variables are adjusted by industry-averages, so that industry-specific effects 
can be mitigated. 
In total, initial data collection generates 848 firms representing 13,401 firm-years 
observations from 1996 to 2013 for further cleaning. Nevertheless, missing data, 
especially those in the historical segment database in compustat reduces the actual sample
size to 288 firms representing 2,296 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2013. This large
amount of missing data is due to the need to calculate the variable of dominant strategy
on all related business units in the corporation. Note that, instead of coding them as 0, 
missing data is excluded. Such a treatment ensures that the estimates are not biased by
misrepresentation of observations in the sample. However, as will be further discussed 
below, such a treatment does not significantly affect the proportions of family firms and 
lone-founder firms as well as the average of other statistics (e.g. Miller et al., 2007). In 
addition, t-tests reveal that there are no significant differences in key statistics between 
the observations included and not included. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the
sample is generally representative of publicly-traded manufacturing firms in North 
America. It is also worth noting that the actual sample size for each model varies due to 
missing data and the loss of time-series observations in manipulating the time lag
between the dependent and other variables. 
Independent and Dependent Variables
The primary independent variable is the family business measure. Although the 
definition of family business is not universally agreed (Chrisman et al., 2005; Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2011), the literature generally measures family business via family













   
  
                                                 
             
          
          
             
  
involvement in ownership and management, which help transfer owning family’s vision 
into firm behaviors (e.g. Chua et al., 1999). This implies that family management is at 
least as important as family ownership, because it is the medium through which the 
owning family can transmit its goals and endow its resources into the firm’s operations
(Chrisman et al., 2012). 
Consistent with this definition, family business is measured as a binary variable in 
which 1 indicates that the focal firm has at least 5 % family ownership, at least two 
family members who are or have been significant owners, top managers, or directors in 
the firm’s history, and at least one family member who is currently involved in the TMT 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2013; Miller et 
al., 2007) 18 19. All firms that do not meet this condition are considered non-family firms 
and are coded as 0. This definition highlights the involvement of multiple family
members in ownership and management, thus ensuring the presence of high possibility of 
intra-family succession in business. Such a definition also ensures that family firms can 
be differentiated from either lone-founder firms, which by definition do not have multiple 
family members involved in the business, or from non-family blockholder-controlled 
firms in which the significant owners are neither family members nor founders. 
The dependent variable used to test H1 and H2a, b, c is the extent of use of a
dominant strategy in related diversification. This variable is also the independent variable
in testing H3. The measurement of this variable is relevant to the classification of related 
18, For a robustness test, family business is also measured as firms with at least 5 % family ownership, at 
least two family members historically involved, and at least one family member currently employed as 
either CEO or chairman. Regression results are similar to the primary results.







    










                                                 
           
 
business, so the first step is to specify the level of relatedness of business units in a 
diversified company. This essay follows Montgomery (1982), Jacquemin and Berry
(1979), and Rumelt (1974) in specifying that relatedness exists when at least 50%20 of 
total revenue (i.e. sales) comes from a single business segment based on SIC 2-digit code. 
Consistent with the definition above, in each related business unit three strategic 
dimensions related to resource investments are calculated: (1) research and development 
intensity (R&D/sales in the unit), (2) capital intensity (capital expenditure/sales in the
unit), and (3) nonproduction overhead (selling, general, and administrative [SGA]
expenses/sales in the unit) (Carpenter, 2000; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Previous
studies have used these three variables in exploring strategic behaviors across business 
units (Harrison et al., 1991, 1993). Furthermore, these three dimensions cover the
primary strategic areas of R&D, production, and administration. Thus, the combination of
these dimensions should reflect strategic action in each unit. Note that advertisement 
intensity is not included because publicly-trade firms often associate advertisement 
expenses in their headquarters rather than diversified units. In addition, nonproduction 
overhead includes selling expense, which is a significant piortion in the overall marketing
expense. Only those in related business units are used in the calculations. 
For each dimension, the standard deviation (S.D.) across all related business units 
is calculated. In total, this step leaves three S.D.s. Because S.D.s may be based on
different scales, they must be standardized. Finally, the extent of a dominant strategy is 
calculated by the inverse of the average of these three standardized variables (S.D.s). The











   
   
  
 







inverse value is used because S.D. measures the variance of a variable, meaning its 
inverse value would be a good measure of consistency of this variables, and that is
naturally linked to the definition of dominant strategy. 
This variable is continuous in nature as it intends to capture the extent of the use
of a dominant strategy across related business units. If revenue coming from the largest 
group of business units is less than 50%, the firm-year observation is excluded from the 
sample. In other words, this yearly-firm observation is believed not having enough level 
of relatedness and is excluded from the sample. 
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (market value to assets adjusted by industrial average
as computed by Chung & Pruitt, 1994) is used as the measure of firm performance. This 
measure has been widely used in the family business literature (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; 
Miller et al., 2007). Industry-adjusted Return on Asset (ROA) is also used for a
robustness test. 
Firm age is calculated as the number of years that a company has been operating
in the market. Firm age is also used as a control variable in testing H3 as firm 
performance may vary according to the time that the firm has been operating. 
Organizational slack is defined as organizational resources that are greater than 
actually needed (Singh, 1986). Thus, organizational slack is calculated as a ratio of liquid 
assets (cash reserves and marketable securities) divided by sales (Tan & Peng, 2003). 
Similar to firm age, this variable is controlled in testing for H3, as organizational slack 
often affects the variation of firm performance. 
Family ownership is measured as the overall percentage of family ownership 




















variable is continuous. Note that although family ownership has been used to classify
family and non-family firms, it still significantly varies in family firms. This feature
allows the test of H2c as some family firms may have higher family ownership compared 
to others. Also note that this variable is used to test for H2c, meaning that the focus here
is the variation of family ownership in the family business population. Any firm with less 
than 5% family ownership is not included in the analysis. 
Family management is measured as the number of family members among the 
Top Management Team (TMT). The sum of family members in the board of director 
(BOD) and family TMT members is also used as an alternative measure of family
management for a robustness test. This alternative measure reflects the fact that family
board members may engage in monitoring, potentially affecting the implementation of
dominant strategy across related business units. 
Control Variables 
As mentioned above, two independent variables (firm age and organizational 
slack) are used as control variables in regressing firm performance (H3). In addition, 
following Anderson and Reeb (2003, 2004) and Miller et al. (2007), a number of control 
variables are included because of their potential influence on firm behaviors and 
performance. 
This study also controls for lone-founder firms, measured by a binary variable in 
which 1 denotes the situation where the lone-founder has at least 5% ownership (Miller et 
al., 2007). Note that lone-founder firms are differentiated from family firms as the latter 






















lone-founder firms and family firms are mutually exclusive, thus this variable is not
included in testing hypotheses for the family business sample (H2a-H2c & H3).  
Non-family blockholder ownership, measured as the overall percentage of 
blockholder ownership in year t-1, is controlled as these non-family owners may have
concerns that are incompatible with the owning family’s interests (Morck et al., 2005). 
Note that these blockholder may be representative of institutional investors as their 
presence is often affiliated with financial institutions.
In addition, this study controls for firm size (i.e., log of the number of sales in year 
t-1, Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004), debt ratio (debt-to-asset ratio measured as a ratio in 
year t-1) and firm risk (the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous three
years, Anderson & Reeb, 2003), as these factors often affect decision-making process and 
accordingly firm performance (Dean & Sharfman, 1996). 
This study also includes five strategic actions at the corproate level for each firm-
year observation. They are advertising intensity (advertising/ sales in t-1 period), R&D
intensity (R&D/sales in t-1 period), plant and equipment newness (net P&E/gross P&E in 
t-1 period), inventory level (inventories/sales in t-1 period), and financial leverage
(debt/equity in t-1 period), all measured as ratios. Indeed, strategic actions in the past 
may affect strategic decisions in future. It should be noted that the independent variable is 
calculated based on the standard deviations of R&D intensity, capital intensity and SGA
ratio across related business units, thus it should be inherently distinctive from the
control variables, which are calculated at the corporate level. Also note that this study
does not include the measure of selling, general, and administrative ratio (SGA). This is 







   
 
 
     








                                                 
             
     
theoretically redundant because a measure of organizational slack has already been 
included21. Capital intensity is not included because it may overlap with the R&D and 
plant and equipment varaibles mentioned above. 
Because corporations often diversify into foreign markets, this study also includes
a measure of international sales calculated by the percentage of sales coming from 
foreign domain measured in year t-1. Because performance may also affect 
diversification in family business, this study controls for past performance (ROA in t-1 
term) because performance in the past may affect strategic action and performance in 
current term. This study also controls for industrial affiliation by industrial average
performance, measured as industry averages of ROA at the four-digit SIC codes in year t-
1. Finally, the inverse Mills ratio calculated to control for endogeneity is added as an 
additional control for all models. 
Controlling for Endogeneity 
It is possible that endogeneity may make the regression estimates biased. This 
study uses two approaches to control for endogeneity. First, as mentioned above, one-
year lags are used between dependent variable and other variables to ensure the direction 
of causality, thus the probability of reverse causality would be mitigated. Second, this 
study uses the Heckman’s (1979) two-stage technique (see Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). 
The key here is to find instrumental variables that are highly related to the independent 
variable (family business measure) but are unrelated to the dependent variables. Put
differently, high quality instrumental variables in this instance should be family-firm 
21, Empirically, SGA ratio and the measure of organizational slack (quick ratio) show a high level of





















specific and not strongly connected to either the dominant strategy of diversification or
firm performance. 
This study uses four instrumental variables. Family trust-holdings affiliated with 
significant owners are measured as a binary variable in which 1 denotes the situation 
where owners have either a trust or foundation associated with family members and 0 
otherwise. Indeed, founders, family owners and other major shareholders often choose to 
use family trusts or foundations to take care of their family members. Nonetheless, there
is no theory that can be used to link family trusts with either firm’s management of
diversification or firm performance. This variable is obtained from firms’ annual proxy
statements. 
Second, this study controls for the fraction of industry sales that comes from 
family firms (i.e. family firm sales fraction by industry), which is naturally related with 
the probability that a firm in the industry is such a firm, yet is independent of the second 
stage dependent variables (dominant strategy and Tobin’s Q) because the latter are
industry-adjusted. Similar measures have been used in previous studies in family business 
(Amit et al., 2015) and finance (Campa & Kedia, 2002). Third, family firms’ fraction of
capital expenditure by industry (i.e. family firm capital fraction by industry) is also used. 
Finally, this study controls for family firms’ fraction of advertisement expenditure by
industry (i.e. family firm advertisement fraction by industry). Note that within three
family firm fraction variables, one is related to performance (sales) and the other two are
related to firm decision-making. Such a design is appropriate because the hypotheses are
related to both dominant strategy and firm performance. Using Heckman’s two-stage

















non-family firm (=0) is regressed against the four instrumental variables and other
controls mentioned above. According to the estimation results, the inverse Mills ratio is
calculated for each yearly-firm observation and included as a control in all models. 
Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 1. In general, 20% of 
the observations can be classified as family firms, while 10% are lone-founder firms. 
These numbers are similar to other studies exploring public-traded lone-founder and 
family firms (Miller et al., 2007). 
In addition, consistent with Chrisman & Patel (2012) as well as Miller and 
colleagues (2007), it is found that the family firm variable is negatively correlated (-0.15, 
p-value<0.001), while the lone-founder firm variable is positively correlated (0.20, p-
value<0.001), with R&D investments. Thus, it appears that the sample is comparable to 
other family business studies of public-traded firms, and missing observations do not 
seem to affect the validity of the sampling. In support of the hypotheses, dominant 
strategy is positively correlated with the family business measure (0.04, p-value<0.05), 
family ownership (0.07, p-value<0.01), and family management (0.09, p-value<0.001). 
Also note that, consistent with the expectations, dominant strategy is positively correlated 
with ROA (0.14, p-value<0.001), but negatively correlated with Tobin’Q (-0.06, p-
value<0.01). 
In terms of the selection of instrumental variables, all four variables are found 
significantly related to the family business variable(s). In addition, their correlations with 











   
  
                                                 
         
           
    
dominant strategy or firm performance22. All of these suggest that the selection of
instrumental variables is appropriate. 
The highest Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 3.47, suggesting that multi-
collinearity is not a big concern. Due to the nature of longitudinal data, Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression analysis may yield biased estimations. In addition, the Hausman 
test (Chi Sq Statistic=349.95, p-value<0.001) suggests that a fixed effect model is more
appropriate than a random-effect model. Thus, fixed-effect longitudinal regression is used 
as the primary analytic technique. In order to control for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity, this study also uses the White cross-section sandwich estimator 
clustered at the firm level (Judson & Owen, 1999). In all models, one year lags between 
dependent and other variables is used.
22, Z-statistics reveal that the smallest difference between instrumental variables’ correlation with family













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As mentioned above, this study uses Heckman’s two-stage approach to partially
control for endogeneity. Model 1 is the first-stage probit treatment model in which the 
binary variable of family business is regressed against instrumental variables and other
controls. The variable of lone-founder firm is not included as a control as the variable is 
mutually exclusive from the family business variable. Overall, the four instrumental 
variables are all positively and significantly related to the family business variable, 
suggesting that the selection of instruments is reasonable. 
Model 2 (Table 2) tests H1. Firm risk (B= -0.0001, p-value<0.05) R&D ratio (B=
-0.334, p-value<0.001) and leverage ratio (B= -0.0001, p-value<0.01) are negatively
related to the dominant strategy variable, while firm size (B= 0.010, p-value<0.01) is 
positively related to the dominant strategy variable. H1 is supported, as the family
business measure (B= 0.013, p-value<0.001) is positively and significantly related to 
dominant strategy. Such a result suggests that ceteris paribus, being a family business 
increases the extent of dominant strategy by 0.013 units compared to the case of non-
family business.
Model 3 (Table 2) tests H2a-H2c. Note that while H1 intends to address the
difference between family and non-family businesses, H2a-H2c aim at exploring the 
heterogeneity in the family business population. Thus, Model 2 focuses on family firms 
only, and the control variable of lone-founder firm is taken out because this type of 
organization is mutually exclusive from family business. In support of H2a and H2c, firm 
age (B= 0.002, p-value<0.05) and family ownership (B= 0.0004, p-value<0.01) are bo`th 






    





        
      
       
       
       
       
      
        
        
       
        
       
       
       
        
       
       
      
       
        
      
          
        
        
     
    
     
        
     





organizational slack is not significantly related to dominant strategy, although the 
coefficient of the variable is positive. 
Table 12 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, H1-H2c
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3





Sample FB & NFB FB & NFB FB
Constant 0.965*** -0.007 -0.014
Family Business (H1) 0.013***
Firm Age (H2a) -0.012* 0.002*
Organizational Slack (H2b) -0.030 0.001
Family Ownership (H2c) 0.0004**
Lone-founder Firm 0.000
Blockholder Ownership -0.015*** 0.000 -0.001†
Firm Size -0.357*** 0.010** -0.004
Debt Ratio 4.714*** 0.011 -0.034
Firm Risk -0.019*** -0.0001* 0.000
Advertisement Ratio -0.619 -0.012 0.034
R&D Ratio -6.534*** -0.334*** -0.405***
Plant Newness -0.636 -0.043 0.032
Inventory Ratio -0.001 0.066 0.060†
Leverage Ratio 2.705** -0.0001** 0.000
International Sales 0.001 0.000 -0.007*
Past Performance -0.765*** -0.005 0.034
Industrial Average Performance -0.551† -0.005 -0.092
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.000 -0.023
Family Trust 2.548***
Family Sales Ratio by Industry 1.618***
Family Advertisement Ratio by Industry 0.768***
Family Capital Ratio by Industry 3.347***
Cross-section 288 285 55
Periods 15 15 14
Sample Size 2,250 2,250 409
Within R Square 0.61 0.33 0.14
F-statistics 382.23*** 551.21***
Absolute Log Likelihood 416.72***
Note: 
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.


















                                                 
              
   
Model 4 (Table 3) explores the performance consequence of dominant strategy in 
family business. It is found that the coefficient of the interaction between the family
business measure and dominant strategy is positive but not significant. Thus, dominant 
strategy does not appear to significantly affect firm performance in family business. 
Model 5 (Table 3) tests for H3. Similar to Model 4, the estimated regression 
coefficient of dominant strategy is positive but not significant (B= 2.530, p-value>0.10). 
H3 is not supported as the interaction between family management and dominant strategy
is positive but not significant (B= 2.021, p-value>0.10). Note that for the Model 4 and 5, 
the estimated coefficients of interactions are consistent with the expectations although 
neither is significant. Among all hypotheses, H1, H2a and H2c are supported, while H2b 
and H3 are not supported. 
Robustness Test 
This study runs a number of robustness tests to ensure that the results are not 
artificial. Firstly, the performance measure is changed from industry-adjusted Tobin’Q to 
industry-adjusted ROA23 (Table 4, Model 6&7). Indeed, Tobin’s Q reflects more about 
the stock market’s perception of firm value, while ROA is a measure of firm’s annual 
profitability. Interestingly, consistent with the expectation, both the interaction between 
the family business measure and dominant strategy (Table 4, Model 6) and the interaction 
between family management and dominant strategy (Table 4, Model 7) become 
significant. 






   
     
     
     
     
     
     
         
       
      
     
     
      
      
     
      
     
     
     
      
     
     
     
     
       
    
     
     
      






Table 13 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, H3
Model Model 4 Model 5
Dependent Variable Firm Performance(Industry-Adjusted Tobin’Q)




Dominant Strategy 0.748 2.530
Family Business * Dominant Strategy 1.355
Family Management * Dominant Strategy (H3) 2.021
Firm Age -0.011 0.013
Organizational Slack -0.013 -0.003
Lone-founder Firm -0.144
Blockholder Ownership 0.000 -0.012
Firm Size -0.961*** -0.896*
Debt Ratio 0.000 0.249
Firm Risk 0.029*** 0.093**
Advertisement Ratio -5.307*** -4.699†
R&D Ratio -2.996*** -3.908
Plant Newness -1.548*** -2.739***
Inventory Ratio -2.488** -0.942
Leverage Ratio -0.023 -0.314
International Sales 0.001** 0.184†
Past Performance 1.255*** 1.848**
Industrial Average Performance -1.611* -1.316
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.206** -0.152
Cross-section 282 55
Periods 13 13
Sample Size 1,941 389
Within R Square 0.20 0.20
F-statistics 8.08*** 6.09***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.





   
     
     
     
     
      
     
        
      
      
     
     
      
      
     
      
     
     
     
      
     
     
     
     
       
    
     
     
     





Table 14 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H3
Model Model 6 Model 7
Dependent Variable Firm Performance(Industry-Adjusted ROA)
Sample FB & NFB FB
Constant 0.032 0.029
Family Business 0.032*
Family Management -0.015 *
Dominant Strategy -0.019 0.110
Family Business * Dominant Strategy 0.273***
Family Management * Dominant Strategy (H3) 0.352*
Firm Age 0.003** 0.003†
Organizational Slack -0.001*** -0.001*
Lone-founder Firm -0.004
Blockholder Ownership -0.0003* -0.001
Firm Size -0.016** -0.009
Debt Ratio 0.004 -0.037
Firm Risk 0.000 0.002***
Advertisement Ratio -0.441*** -0.203†
R&D Ratio 0.087 0.568***
Plant Newness 0.003 -0.041
Inventory Ratio -0.256*** -0.308***
Leverage Ratio -0.001 -0.036***
International Sales 0.00005*** 0.005
Past Performance 0.038 0.026
Industrial Average Performance 0.004 -0.042
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.009* 0.010
Cross-section 282 55
Periods 13 13
Sample Size 1,941 389
Within R Square 0.11 0.10
F-statistics 47.64*** 25.15***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.






















Figure 4 plots Model 6. It is found that the use of dominant strategy does not 
cause any change in performance in non-family business. However, dominant strategy
has a positive effect on family firm’s performance. When the extent of dominant strategy
is low, non-family firms outperforms family firms. But when dominant strategy reaches a
relatively high level, family firms outperform nonfamily firms. 
Figure 5 plots Model 7. Even in the family business population, dominant strategy
tends to show a positive relationship with firm performance given high family
management. Indeed, when dominant strategy reaches a relatively high level, family
firms with high family management tend to outperform those with low family
management. Note that, it appears that the hypothesized moderating effect of family
involvement is more salient when using ROA as the performance measure compared to 
the measure of Tobin’s Q. This finding will be further elaborated in the discussion 
section.
Furthermore, note that the measure of family business does not necessarily







  Figure 5 Family Management, Dominant Strategy and Firm Performance (ROA)
 




definition and the measurement. Here, two alternative measures of family business are
used in testing for H1. 
To begin, instead of one family manager, this study uses at least two family
managers in TMT to classify family business, aligned with at least 5% family ownership 
and at least two family members historically or currently involved in business. Such a
measure highlights the presence of multiple family members in TMT, which may signal 
the presence of intra-family succession intention. Consistent with the primary analysis, 
H1 (Table 5, Model 8) is supported. In addition, family business is measured by the 
number of family managers in business if there is at least 5% family ownership and at 
least two family members historically or currently involved in business. This measure is 
continuous in nature and may better reflect the variance of family involvement in 
business. Also note that family managers are directly involved in daily-management in 
business. This issue is important as publicly-traded firms feature the isolation between 







   
   
 
 
       
     
          
    
      
      
      
     
      
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
       
   
   
   
     








capture the vision of the owning family, as more family managers may signal a higher 
intention of maintaining family’s control in business possibly across generations. Again, 
H1 (Table 5, Model 9) is supported.  
Table 15 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H1
Model Model 8 Model 9
Dependent Variable Dominant Strategy
Dominant 
Strategy
Sample FB & NFB FB & NFB
Constant -0.001 -0.005
Family Business (>= 2 family managers, H1) 0.004†
Family Management (H1) 0.005**
Lone-founder Firm -0.0001 -0.0001
Blockholder Ownership 0.000 0.000
Firm Size 0.010** 0.010**
Debt Ratio 0.012 0.012
Firm Risk 0.000* 0.000*
Advertisement Ratio -0.019 -0.013
R&D Ratio -0.335*** -0.335***
Plant Newness -0.042* -0.043*
Inventory Ratio 0.068* 0.067*
Leverage Ratio -0.00001** -0.00001**
International Sales 0.000 0.000
Past Performance -0.005 -0.005
Industrial Average Performance -0.006 -0.006
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.002 0.001
Cross-section 285 285
Periods 15 15
Sample Size 2,250 2,250
Within R Square 0.33 0.33
F-statistics 385.10*** 385.10***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
In addition, this study also tries to use the sum of family members on the TMT 
and the board of directors (BOD) members as an alternative measure of family







     
  
   
      
   
         
    
   
    
    
   
    
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
     
   
  
    







that family BOD members may engage in monitoring the operations of diversified units 
thus may have extensive influences in the daily management of diversified units. Again, 
H3 is supported.  
Table 16 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H3
Model Model 10
Dependent Variable Firm Performance(Industry-Adjusted Tobin’Q)
Sample FB
Constant 30.309**
Family Management (TMT& BOD) -8.469*
Dominant Strategy -23.767*














Industrial Average Performance 0.452




Within R Square 0.20
F-statistics 3.03***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
It is worth noting that H2b is rejected in the primary and the robustness tests. In 
















strategy and firm performance in family business. The following tests intend to provide
further analyses on these two issues. To begin, in the primary analysis the quick ratio 
(case reserves and market securities divided by annual sales) is used as the measure of 
organizational slack. This measure represents the unabsorbed slack at the corporate level. 
Nonetheless, such a measure may not be a good indictor to capture the extent of
parsimony at the business unit level. In another words, having high slack at the
headquarters of a diversified corporate does not mean the same level of slack in 
diversified business units. Thus, this measure is replaced by the SGA ratio, which is the
aggregation of selling, general, and administrative expenditures in all business units. 
Different from the quick asset ratio which is largely managed by the corporate 
headquarters. The SGA is the aggregation of marketing and administrative expenses from 
business units. Indeed, consistent with the hypothesis, it is found that the estimated 
coefficient of the SGA ratio is negative and significant (Table 7, Model 11). It appears 
that the nonsignificant result of H2b in the primary analysis is due to the way






   
  
   
    
      
     
    
    
   
    
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
     
   
  
   
    










Table 17 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H2b
Model Model 11
Dependent Variable Dominant Strategy
Sample FB
Constant 0.036
Firm Age (H2a) 0.003***
Organizational Slack (SGA ratio) (H2b) -0.129**












Industrial Average Performance -0.074




Within R Square 0.13
F-statistics 374.06***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1 
In addition, the analyses mentioned above show some inconsistency regarding the 
interactive effect between family business and dominant strategy. One possible
explanation is that, different from strategic decision-making at the corporate level, 
managing diversified business units requires a higher extent of family control by which 
the owning family can transfer its influence into the actual management of diversified 
















                                                 
              
    
business measure and dominant strategy should be more salient when the owning family
has relatively high control of the business. 
Hence, family business is measured by a 10%24 threshold of family ownership, as 
well as at least two family members historically involved in business and at least one 
family member currently in TMT. Here, it is found that the coefficient of the interaction 
becomes positive and significant (Table 8, Model 12). Compared to the result in the
primary analysis, it seems that the positive effect of dominant strategy in family business 
is salient only when the owning family has sufficient control in business. 
Following the same logic, it is expected that the interactive effect between family
management and dominant strategic become more salient when the owning family has 
sufficient ownership in business. This means that the effect of H3 would be more salient 
if the owning family has higher control in business. Thus, H3 is tested in the family
business observations where the owning family has at least 10% ownership (Table 9, 
Model 13). H3 is supported at the 0.001 level of significance. 
24, 20% threshold is also used. And regression results are similar to the one reported here in terms of






     
    
   
     
   
      
    
   
    
    
    
   
    
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   











Table 18 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H3 
Model Model 12
Dependent Variable Firm Performance(Industry-Adjusted Tobin’Q)
Sample FB & NFB
Constant 2.823***
Family Business (10%) -3.648†
Dominant Strategy 0.387















Industrial Average Performance -1.401†




Within R Square 0.21
F-statistics 10.31***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.






     
   
   
    
   
        
    
   
    
    
   
    
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
















Table 19 Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H3
Model Model 13



















Industrial Average Performance -1.491*




Within R Square 0.25
F-statistics 11.28***
Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
To summarize, results of robustness tests show some consistency with the primary
results. Nevertheless, after changing the measure and ownership threshold, all hypotheses 
are supported. 
Discussion
Studies have highlighted that family’s involvement in business may result in 






















attention is family business diversification. Yet no one has looked at the specific
management of diversified businesses, which is at least equally important as the 
diversification itself (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Kazanjian & Drazin, 1987; Shayne Gary, 
2005). Indeed, without proper management, any diversification or acquisition attempt
would inevitably fail. 
This essay addresses this area. In particular, it is hypothesized that in comparison 
to nonfamily firms, family firms are more likely to use a dominant strategy in managing
diversification, characterized by a high level of similarity in the patterns of resource
allocations across related business units. It is also hypothesized that family firms with 
higher firm age, lower organizational slack and higher family ownership are more likely
to use such a strategy. In addition, it is hypothesized that such a unique way of managing
diversification would improve performance in family business, especially those with high 
family’s involvement in management. Despite some inconsistent findings, the primary
and robustness, tests provide supports to all hypotheses. 
It is worth noting that H2b is not supported by the primary analysis but is 
supported in the robustness test when the SGA ratio –rather than the quick asset ratio- is 
used as a reverse measure of resource parsimony. This is because SGA is a better 
measure to capture the extent of resource parsimony in business units whereas the quick 
ratio is a better measure at the corporate headquarters level. Indeed, it appears that 
conceptualizations and measurements at the headquarters are not analogous to those at 
the business unit level.  
Also note that H3 is not supported when industry-adjusted Tobin’Q is used as the 





















This may reflect the fact that Tobin’Q primarily captures the market’s valuation, while 
ROA is more related to the profitability of the company in creating wealth. Thus, the 
relatedness resulting from the usage of a dominant strategy across diversified units should 
result in higher profitability but may not necessarily improve market’s valuation. This is 
because market investors do not have perfect information about strategies at the unit
level, hence having a dominant strategy in related units may not necessarily improve
investor’s evaluation toward the corporate. Another explanation is that Tobin’s Q is a 
measure based upon the long-term accumulated performance of the company, whereas 
ROA primarily captures the short-term fluctuation in performance. Nevertheless, the
theory used in this essay largely concern with short-term rather than long-term 
performance, and the ROA performance measure may be more aligned with the theory. 
In addition, H3 is also supported when the ownership threshold is increased from 
5% to 10% in classifying family firms. As Gomez-Mejia and colleagues (2011, p659)
suggested, “it is safe to conclude that every operational definition (of family business) is 
context specific rather than generalizable.” Indeed, diversification may create a unique 
context that demands a high threshold effect of family ownership. In another words, the 
increasing complexity in organizational structure in a diversified corporate requires a 
higher ownership threshold to ensure that the owning family can successfully transfer its 
goals into strategic behaviors at the unit level. Indeed, there often exists interest 
divergence between unit managers and corporate owners (Govindarajan, 1989), thus
decision-making at the unit level may not reflect goals of corporate owners unless the
owners have sufficient control over the whole corporation. In addition, managerial 






















(Govindarajan, 1986). Thus, certain ownership thresholds used at the corproate level may
no longer be appropriate when studying starties at the unit level.   
All combined, it appears reasonable to conclude that the diversification setting
may create a unique context such that conceptualizations and operationalization used in 
previous family business studies are no longer valid. 
Theoretical Implication
This section intends to discuss the theoretical implications of this study which 
may help shed light on future studies. 
To begin, the family business field has experienced notable advancement with 
exceptional theoretical developments in understanding how and why family firm’s 
strategic behaviors would be distinctive and heterogeneous (Chrisman et al., 2013; Chua
et al., 2012). Nevertheless, these studies largely fail to distinguish corporate-level and 
business-level strategies, neglecting the fact that publicly-traded family firm often holds a 
portfolio of diversified business units. Note that corporate-level strategy is inherently
different from business-level strategy as the former is concerned with managing a
portfolio of multiple business areas while the latter focuses on a single business. 
This essay is the first attempt to investigate how family firms manage diversified 
business units as well as the performance consequence of such a unique way of 
management. As discussed above, inconsistencies among the primary and robustness 
tests seem to suggest that some well-grounded theoretical predictions as well as empirical 
operationalization at the business level may not be valid at the corporate level. Indeed, it 
is possible that strategies in some units may deviate from the owning family’s goals and 






















suggest that transferring family shareholder’s goals to unit behaviors would require a
higher extent of controlling power compared to the case at the business level. Thus, the 
operationalization of family business may need to be revised to fit into the setting of 
diversified family corporations with multiple business units. 
It is also worth noting that this research area remains under-developed with 
multiple research opportunities existing. For instance, it is still not well known whether
family involvement in the dominant coalition may or may not affect the strategies and 
performance in all business units in family-controlled and –managed corporateions. In 
addition, given the presence of multiple goals and objectives in a owning family, it is also 
possible that units may be assigned with distinctive goals. This issue may become salient 
given the coexistence of related and unrelated business units in diversified corporates. In 
other words, related units may be used to achieve the goal(s) with high priorities while
unrelated ones may be used to achieve those with low priorities. It is also possible that 
individual family members may be in charge of business units, thus unit strategies may
reflect their individual interests rather than the collective interest of the whole family. 
Furthermore, the owning family may endow more resources to some units instead of 
others, thus the link between family resource-endowment and unit strategy/performance
may be more salient in some units rather than others. Due to the limitation of the data 
especially the lack of information on owning families, this study is not able to directly
test these predictions. 
In addition, the theory is based upon the argument that family firms are more
likely than non-family firms to adopt a dominant strategy in diversification. This is 





















over time, because the owning family is parsimonious in resource utilization, and because
the owning family has the power to transmit its influence in firm decision-making. Based 
upon the behavioral theory of the firm, such a theoretical framework highlights that the
combination of family goals, resources, and governance structures results in unique 
decision-making patterns in managing diversified business units. Note that compared to 
other theories that highlight one or two rather than all three elements, the theory used in 
this study ensures that the framework is comprehensive yet parsimonious. 
Furthermore, when exploring the link between dominant strategy and firm 
performance in family business, this study relies upon the coordination literature to build 
the theory. In particular, it is argued that there are three primary sources of costs in
coordination: problem-framing, communication and conflict resolution. It is also argued 
that interactions among family managers may lead to less coordination problems, thus the
performance consequence of a dominant strategy is likely to be higher in family firms, 
especially those with more family managers. Although such a theoretical framework is 
developed for this essay, the theory can also be applied in other settings of coordination 
in family business including inter-firm alliances, new product development, creativity
and innovation, self-managing teams and others. 
Finally, while previous family business studies have highlighted some potential 
distinctive effects between family ownership and management upon firm performance, it 
is further argued that this effect is due to the advantage of family management in 
coordinating complex activities. Thus, it appears that family management can be
conceptualized as having a moderating effect on the relationship between firm strategy











   











While this study can make several contributions, it is also important to recognize
its limitations. First, there are a large amount of missing data in the database on business 
units. Based upon the portions of lone-founder and family firms, this does not appear to 
be a problem. Nevertheless, this is still a potential issue that may affect the accuracy of 
the findings. Indeed, missing data is relatively common in previous studies on business 
units (e.g. Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Future studies may try to validate the findings with 
primary data collection or other sources that would ensure a lower level of missing data. 
Furthermore, family business is defined by a family’s involvement in ownership 
and governance with a vision for how the firm will benefit the family, potentially across
generations (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Chua, Chrisman & Sharma, 1999). However, family
business is measured by family’s involvement in ownership and management, and did not
directly measure the owning family’s vision. This is largely due to the secondary data 
source. In addition, the measurement has been widely used by previous studies in family
business (e.g. Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2003, 2010; Miller et al., 
2007, 2011). Moreover, the family’s involvement in ownership and management may
reflect the family’s ability in transferring family’s vision into firm behaviors. Finally, the 
involvement of multiple family members in business may signal the presence of existing
or potential intra-family succession intention. Nonetheless, the vision of the family has 
not been directly measured. Future studies may try to use a more valid measure that can 
directly reflect the vision of the dominant family coalition.  
Similarly, the theory is developed upon concepts such as tradition, parsimony, and 



















    
  
  
are used to develop testable hypotheses based upon accessible secondary data in publicly-
traded family firms. Indeed, the secondary data source largely limits the abilities to 
directly measure these constructs and test the theories accordingly. For instance, arguably
some junior late-generation family members may choose to deviate from rather than 
completely follow family tradition. Indeed, the usage of proxy measurement may become 
a potential issue that may affect the validity of the study design. Future studies may try to 
develop valid scale measurement of these concepts to further test the hypotheses. 
In addition, strategies and performance at the business unit level may be affected 
by the status of business unit managers. In particular, whether the manager belongs to the
owning family may be a critical factor. Due to the limitation of the secondary data, this
information is not accessible.  Future studies may try to collect primary data at the unit
level to further test the hypotheses. 
In addition, this study focuses on firm age, organizational slack and family
ownership as three determinants in exploring the heterogeneity in family business. Such a
conceptualization was supported by the empirical results. Nevertheless, it is also 
important to note that these three variables represent a small portion of variation in the
family business population. Put differently, there are more factors related to goals, 
resources and governance, especially those stemming from the family system that may
further contribute to the heterogeneity of the family business population. 
It is also important to note that, although there are multiple hypotheses in this 
study, they are tested separately. Note that some analytic techniques such as path analysis
and structural equation modeling (SEM) may test multiple hypotheses simultaneously. 





















   
analysis, cross-sections (682 firms) and years (9 years) must be added as control variables 
into the model (682+9), which may greatly limit the degree of freedom in the analysis
and make the analysis infeasible. Future studies should try to use other analytic 
approaches to test all hypotheses simultaneously. 
Moreover, this study uses publicly-traded firms in S&P 1500 manufacturing as 
the primary sample. Indeed, one feature of public-traded family firms is the limited range
of family ownership, as it is impossible for family ownership to reach 100% by nature. 
Thus, the generalizability of the findings to small and privately owned family and non-
family firms may be limited. Future studies are encouraged to replicate this study among
privately-owned small- and medium- sized firms. 
In addition, this study excludes firms without at least five years continuous
observations. Such a treatment is to ensure that the calculation of dominant strategy is 
meaningful. Nevertheless, it may also affect the generalabiliy of the sampling, as newly-
founded firms or firms that are reluctant to release information to the public may be
excluded from the sample. Future studies may try to use primary data collection in 
dealing with these issues.
Finally, this study chooses to focus on the 1996-2013 range in the analysis. Such a
period is not homogenous regarding economic growth as well as market competition, 
which should provide enough variations in terms of dominant strategy as well as firm 
performance. However, variations in such a turbulent period may bias the empirical 
results. Nonetheless, even given such a long and dynamic period, the primary results are










To conclude, this essay intends to explore the antecedents and consequences of 
dominant strategy among diversified publicly-trade family and non-family business. The
differences between family and non-family firms as well as the heterogeneity among
family firms themselves presented in this essay can help scholars, family business 
members, and investors better understand family involvement and how it impacts the




















Drawing upon the behavior theory of the firm, this dissertation aims to explore the
homogeneity of family firms’ strategic decision-making over time (strategic persistence) 
and across related business units (dominant strategy), as well as their antecedents and 
performance consequences in family business. The theme that both essays share intends 
to highlight that family businesses may show high levels of internal constancy in strategic
decision-making. Indeed, based upon S&P 1500 manufacturing firms from 1996 to 2013, 
it is found that family firms have a higher level of strategic persistence and a more
consistent dominant strategy than non-family firms. In addition, it appears that being
older, with less organizational slack and having higher family involvement in ownership 
and management tends to strengthen the two kinds of homogeneity in family businesses. 
Finally, it is found that high homogeneity in decision-making can result in better
performance in family business compared to non-family firms, especially for those with 
high family involvement in management. This chapter intends to summarize the findings 
and discuss the implications of the two essays together. 
To begin, recent development in the family business literature highlights that 
family firms are heterogeneous (Chua et al., 2012), and a higher level of heterogeneity
may be a feature that distinguishes family from non-family firms (Chrisman & Patel, 
























show high levels of internal homogeneity in their strategic behaviors. Note that the 
argument does not contradict the view of family business heterogeneity, as the focus here
is the homogeneity in an individual family business, while the heterogeneity view focuses 
on inter-family-firm differences. Indeed, findings in this dissertation seem to suggest that, 
although as a whole population, family firms show a high level of heterogeneity, 
individual family businesses may show high levels of internal homogeneity. Thus, to get 
a comprehensive understanding of this unique type of organization, we need to recognize
that both heterogeneity and homogeneity exist, but are manifested in different ways and 
at different levels. 
In addition, our theoretical framework covers idiosyncratic goals, resources and 
governance structures in family business (Chua et al., 2012). Note that overly
emphasizing a single dimension may result in inaccurate predictions regarding how 
family firms would behave and perform. Indeed, just as Chua and colleagues (2012, p2)
have warned, “Continuing to ignore family firm heterogeneity could institutionalize a
distorted homogeneous view of family firms that generates ‘panaceas’, supposedly
applicable to all family firms”. Nonetheless, few theories in the family business literature
cover all three dimensions; more than often theories only emphasize one at the expense of 
others (one notable exception is Carney’s work in 2005). Thus, the theoretical framework 
proposed in this dissertation is more comprehensive compared to prevailing theories in 
the family business field.  
Furthermore, one notable view in the family business literature is that family
firms need to learn from non-family firms to make more favorable strategic choices (e.g. 
















    
  
  
   
    
Chandler (1990) who views family businesses as relics of an old era. His followers argue
that learning from non-family firms and embracing innovation (Block, 2012), risk-taking
or corporate entrepreneurship (Chirico et al., 2011) may bring competitive advantages to 
family-owned and –managed type of organizations. Findings in this dissertation suggest 
that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, both essays suggest that family firms have a
more homogeneous pattern in making and implementing its decisions, and family firms 
can benefit from such a homogeneous pattern of decision-making. These findings seem to 
suggest that competitive advantages in family business may stem from unique sources, 
and simply imitating non-family firms may not be the best way for family firms to 
achieve superior performance. 
In a similar inquiry, some scholars advocate that at least some if not all family
firms should professionalize by employing non-family managers and experts. Such an 
argument is often based upon the assumption that the family labor pool tends to be
limited in its size and quality, and recruiting non-family talents may help overcome the
defects of family managers (Chua et al., 2009). This dissertation challenges this view. 
What have been found in both essays suggest that, the combination of family
management and homogeneous decision-making improves family firm performance. 
Indeed, studies have already recognized that family mangers are different from family
owners regarding their effects on firm strategies and performance (Block, 2010; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Wu et al., 2007). This dissertation further demonstrates that 
family managers may have certain advantages in some strategic actions. The view that 
non-family professional managers are always superior compared to family managers 










   
   
  
   
    
  
 
   
 
 
   
which proposes that there should be a “fit” between strategic action and implementation, 
and a high level of fit would likely lead to superior performance (Kammerlander et al., 
2015). In this regard, it appears that family’s control in general and family involvement in 
management in particular would fit better with a more homogenous pattern in a family
firm’s strategic decision-making. 
The focal concern of essay 1 is strategic persistence, which is naturally related to 
long-term orientation in the literature (e.g. Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). Indeed, the 
family business literature has long recognized that some family firms are oriented toward 
the long run, and such long-term orientation may contribute to superior performance
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Nevertheless, few has developed theories regarding
what types of family firms are more likely to express such an orientation, and how such 
an orientation would contribute to firm performance. More importantly, the attention is 
often drawn to short-term strategic behavior rather than to the long-term window for 
multiple strategic dimensions. Such neglect may result in inaccurate theoretical 
propositions as well as biased empirical results. This study helps to fill these gaps and 
shed light on the long-term orientation literature in the family business field. Indeed, 
strategic persistence can be viewed as a manifestation of long-term orientation in firm 
behavior. Our empirical results suggest that in general family firms are more persistent 
compared to non-family firms, and this strategic persistence may help improve their
performance. 
In addition, essay 1 uses a resource management view (e.g. Simon et al., 2007; 
2008) in exploring the relationship between strategic persistence and firm performance. 







    
 
   
   
  











competitive advantages in some family firms. Nevertheless, existing RBV studies often 
draw attention to different categories of family resources in business, assuming having
resource endowments from the family system is sufficient to ensure superior 
performance. Different from this line of inquiry, essay 1 focuses on the overall features of 
family resources, which may fundamentally affect the ways that owning families manage
family-endowed resources (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).  Indeed, it is the management of
resources that eventually determines the consequence of any strategic action. Thus, some
family firms are better than non-family firms not only because these family firms have
valuable, rare and non-imitable and non-substitutable resources, but also because these
family firms have a better way of managing resources. Such a perspective also suggests
that given high inseparability, specificity and intangibility, family firms may have
advantages in strategic actions that require less acquisition, mobilization, and divestment
of resources in the business systems. 
Essay 2 explores the pursuit of dominant strategy in family business. To the best 
of our knowledge, this essay is the first attempt to investigate how family firms manage
diversified business units as well as the performance consequence of such a unique way
of management. Indeed, most of family business studies at present tend to focus on the
business level, overlooking the fact that some family firms are large corporations with 
diversified portfolios of multiple business units. Findings in essay 2 suggest that publicly-
traded family firms are more likely to pursue a dominant strategy in their related business 
units. Such a finding may shed light to the family business literature in terms of the 
























It should also be noted that essay 2 relies upon the coordination literature in
exploring the link between dominant strategy and firm performance. In particular, it is 
argued that there are three primary sources of costs in coordination: problem-framing, 
communication, and conflict resolution. It is also argued that interactions among family
managers may lead to less coordination problems, thus the performance consequence of a
dominant strategy is likely to be higher in family firms, especially those with more family
managers. Although such a theoretical framework is developed for this essay, the theory
can also be applied in other settings of coordination in family business. For instance, 
coordination may take the form of inter-firm alliances, new product development, 
creativity and innovation, self-managing teams and others. This suggests that family
firms may have better performance in these coordination activities when they are
managed by family members. Future studies should try to apply this theoretical view to 
other coordination in family businesses. 
Future Research Directions 
While this study may make several contributions, it is also important to recognize
its limitations, which may help shed light on future studies. To begin, one underlying
argument in this dissertation is that consistent patterns of decision-making are beneficial 
to family-owned and –managed businesses. While this argument is arguably accurate, 
there may be some contingencies that may affect the performance consequences of 
strategic persistence and dominant strategy in family business. For instance, given high 
uncertainties and dynamics in the market, being overly persistent may lead to path
dependency and prohibit the family firm from adapting to changing environments. 






















   
dynamic capability –rather than being consistent over time and/or across diversified 
units- may help build competitive advantages in family business. Future studies may
further explore these contingencies to obtain better understandings of the performance
consequences of strategic persistence and dominant strategy in family business.  
Also, this dissertation defines family business by the family’s involvement in 
ownership and management as well as the family’s vision of using the business to benefit 
the family and family members. Although several alternative measures of family business 
have been used, and some of the measures are related to the “vision” of the family, it is 
important to note that the “vision” of the family has not been directly measured, which 
may lead to isolation between the theory and the methodology. Future studies should try
to use better scales of family business in testing for the hypotheses in this study. 
In addition, this study uses firm age, organizational slack and family ownership as 
three measures related to family tradition, resource parsimony and family control, 
respectively. Such a conceptualization was supported by the empirical results. However, 
family tradition, resource parsimony and family control are not directly measured in the
study. One reason is the secondary data source, as it is rather difficult to gain primary
data from publicly traded companies. This issue may lead to the isolation between the 
theory and the methodology. Indeed, future studies should use valid scales to better test 
the relationship between the constructs and strategic persistence. 
Furthermore, this study uses publicly-traded firms in S&P 1500 manufacturing as 
the primary sample. One feature of public-traded family firms is the limited range of 
family ownership, as it is impossible for family ownership to reach 100% by nature. In 

















   
  
  
because only owners with more than 5% ownership are reported in the proxy statements. 
Such a sampling would limit the generalizability of the findings in small and privately
owned family and non-family firms, as privately-owned and/or small- and medium-sized 
family firms often feature high family involvement as well as a higher range of family
involvement compared to publicly-traded family firms. Future studies are encouraged to 
replicate this study in the privately-owned small- and medium- sized firms. 
Finally, this dissertation chooses to focus on the 1996-2013 range in the analysis. 
Such a period is not homogenous regarding economic growth as well as market 
competition, which should provide enough variations in terms of strategic persistence, 
dominant strategy, and firm performance. However, even given such a long and dynamic
period, the primary results remain significant. Future studies may further test the
hypotheses in different periods. 
In sum, this dissertation explores the homogeneous patterns of decision-making in 
single family business, as well as their antecedents and performance consequences. The
findings of this dissertation can help scholars and practitioners better understand how and 
why family involvement may affect the pattern of strategic decision over time and across 
diversified business units, and how and why such a homogenous pattern of decision-
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